“MacMahon desires to deliver the main attack on Paris on the west front of the enceinte, from the Bois de Boulogne or Billancourt against the bastion of the Point du Jour. In order to prevent the insurgents from continuing their resistance in the city from point to point, he wishes, at the same time--that is, during the same night--to endeavour to surprise the north front, and seize some positions in the north of Paris. Ten or twelve thousand men would be employed for this purpose, who would start in the evening from Gemevilliers, and march by way of Villeneuve, La Garonne and St. Denis, as also through Epinay, St. Denis, and Aubervilliers, towards the gates of La Chapelle and La Villette. With the assistance of some of the commandants of the National Guard, with whom an understanding was being entered into, and by taking advantage of the railway, and of the numerous conveyances which still frequented the main roads, it was considered possible to bring small detachments of trustworthy troops right into the city. In case the attack were repulsed, MacMahon binds himself to withdraw all the troops employed by him along the same route, on the same day, behind the rayon on this side, that is to say, behind the left bank of the Seine. By this means the proximity of French and German troops for any length of time would be avoided. Permission could hardly be refused for the French troops to march through St. Denis, although they are on no account to be allowed to tarry or post reserves there. General Borel was obviously desirous of preventing all co-operation on the part of the German troops and of the forts occupied by us, and gave it clearly to be understood that he regarded such direct support as undesirable on political grounds. He did not believe the insurgents would venture to pursue the storming parties in case the latter did not succeed--an opinion which is also shared here--and he positively denied that the French Commander-in-Chief intended to bombard the north front, or to proceed to a regular attack upon it if the surprise were to fail. As, according to these overtures, the French were prepared to forego our co-operation, and our own forces in and behind the forts are quite sufficient, I have, as already reported in a telegram of the 10th instant, given up the idea of a concentration of further troops outside Paris. In accordance with the wishes of the French Government, I consider it desirable in the first place to avoid everything that would attract the attention of the insurgents to the north front, and thereby endanger the success of the surprise. At the same time we consider it necessary to avert, as far as possible, all accidental losses to our troops should the insurgents, after repelling an attack, open fire with their artillery on the retiring French columns. In the event of his Majesty the Emperor and King afterwards expressly ordering the German troops to co-operate in the attack on Paris, I