The charge quotes a portion of the very words of the article. But that this portion can be separated from the rest of the sentence, and made to designate a distinct, substantive offence, would be a monstrous supposition. The whole stress, the whole meaning lies in the words “infamous and scandalous;” but because there may be scandalous and infamous conduct, which does not fall under the cognisance of a court-martial, it is added as a further definition, that it must be such misconduct as affects the character of an officer and a gentleman.[5] The article of war intends to describe such conduct as would make a man _scandalous and infamous amongst his fellow-officers_. Suppose it were thought fit to frame similar rules for the medical profession, and one of these declared, “That any one who shall behave in a scandalous and infamous manner unbecoming the character of a physician and a gentleman, shall, on conviction thereof, be expelled from the profession,” would any one in his senses think it sufficient to adopt the last qualifying phrase, “unbecoming the character of a physician and a gentleman,” as descriptive of an offence which, under this rule, would incur an expulsion from the faculty? Why, it might be thought “unbecoming” a physician to break rude and silly jests upon his patients, (as a late celebrated character is accused of doing,) but not for such offences, we presume, would any one imagine that expulsion from the profession was provided. But we shall be told that the proceedings of a court-martial are not fettered by the same strict rules which preside over the record in a court of law. This is very true. It is sufficient if the offence is substantially indicated. Perhaps it will be argued that these words, “unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman,” must be taken as a part for the whole, and that the charge _was_ essentially for scandalous and infamous behaviour. If so, the court has placed itself in the following dilemma, from which we do not see any possibility of escape:—_Either_ the charge is to be understood as substantially for scandalous and infamous conduct—and, in that case, who will venture to assert that the evidence supports so heinous an accusation?—who will venture to assert that the concealment or equivocation proved against Captain Douglas was that falsehood, that sort of lie, which stamps a man as scandalous and infamous, and drives him from the society of gentlemen? _Or_ (which is the plain common-sense view of the case) the charge is what it professes to be—for “unbecoming” conduct—it is this charge which is present to the minds of the members of the court-martial—it is on this he is tried, of this which he is convicted; and _then_, after being found guilty of this all but venial offence, he is visited with the punishment of a far heavier one—for behaviour which would make him scandalous and infamous amongst his brother officers.