Of two firms selling similar goods, of equal quality, at equal prices, that firm will do the larger trade which keeps the greater number of commercial travellers and spends the greater sum upon advertisement. But travellers cost money, and advertising costs money. And so we find that travellers and advertisements add to the cost of distribution. Therefore competition, although by underbidding it has a limited tendency to lower the prices of goods, has also a tendency to increase the price in another way. If Brown lowers the price of his soap the user of soap is the gainer. But if Brown increases the cost of his advertisements and his staff of travellers, the user is the loser, because the extra cost has to be paid for in the price of soap. Now, if the London County Council made soap for all London, there would be 1. A saving in cost of rent, plant, and management. 2. A saving of profits by selling at cost price. 3. A saving of the whole cost of advertising. 4. A saving of the wages of the commercial travellers. Under a system of trade competition all those four items (plus the effects of adulteration) have to be paid for by the consumer, that is to say, by the users of soap. And what is true of soap is true of most other things. That is why co-operation for use beats competition for sale and profit. That is why the Municipal gas, water, and tram services are better and cheaper than the same services under the management of private companies. That is _one_ reason why Socialism is better than non-Socialism. As an example of the difference between private and Municipal works, let us take the case of the gas supply in Liverpool and Manchester. These cities are both commercial, both large, both near the coalfields. The gas service in Liverpool is a private monopoly, for profit; that of Manchester is a co-operative monopoly, for service. In Liverpool (figures of 1897) the price of gas was 2s. 9d. per thousand feet. In Manchester the price of gas was 2s. 3d. In Liverpool the profit on gas was 81/2d. per thousand feet. In Manchester the profit was 71/2d. per thousand feet. In Liverpool the profits went to the company. In Manchester the profits went to the ratepayers. Thus the Manchester ratepayer was getting his gas for 2s. 3d. less 71/2d., which means that he was getting it at 1s. 71/2d., while the Liverpool ratepayer was being charged 2s. 9d. The public monopoly of Manchester was, therefore, beating the private monopoly of Liverpool by 1s. 11/2d. per thousand feet in the price of gas. In _To-day's Work_, by George Haw, and in _Does Municipal Management Pay?_ by R. B. Suthers, you will find many examples as striking and conclusive as the one I have suggested above.