British Quarterly Review, American Edition, Vol. LIV: July and October, 1871Various
History
British Quarterly Review, American Edition, Vol. LIV: July and October, 1871
Various
English periodicals
But before passing to these, we may observe that all the _à priori_
theorists, professing to conduct us to the desired conclusion on the
level road of demonstration (while they all contradict their own
principles, and furtively introduce the contingent facts of
experience), have but a faint conception of the magnitude of the
question at issue. To work out a demonstration as with algebraic
formulæ, to contemplate the problem as one of mathematical science,
under the light and guidance of the reason alone, and unaided by the
moral intuitions, betokens a lack of insight into the very problem in
question. The object of which we are in search is not a blank
colourless abstraction, or necessary entity. Suppose that a supreme
existence were demonstrable, that bare entity is not the God of
theism, the infinite Intelligence and Personality, of whose existence
the human spirit desires some assurance, if it can be had. And a
formal demonstration of a primitive source of existence (_more
geometrico_) is of no theological value. It is an absolute zero,
inaccessible alike to the reason and to the heart, before which the
human spirit freezes; and as a mere _ultimatum_ its existence is
conceded by every philosophic school.
The germs of the cosmological argument (as of the ontological) are
found in the scholastic philosophy, though its elaboration was left to
the first and second periods of the modern era. Diodorus of Tarsus,
John Damascenus, Hugo of St. Victor, and Peter of Poitiers, have each
contributed to the development of this mode of proof. It is the
argument _à contingentia mundi_, or _ex rerum mutabilitate_; and may
be briefly stated thus: If the contingent exists, the necessary also
exists. I myself, the world, the objects of sense, are contingent
existences, and there must be a cause of these, which cause must be
also an effect. Go back, therefore, to the cause of that cause, and to
its cause again, and you must at length pause in the regress; and by
rising to a First Clause, you escape from the contingent and reach the
necessary. From the observation of the manifold sequences of nature
you rise to the causal fountain-head, as you cannot travel backwards
for ever along an infinite line of dependent sequences.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account