British Quarterly Review, American Edition, Vol. LIV: July and October, 1871Various
History
British Quarterly Review, American Edition, Vol. LIV: July and October, 1871
Various
English periodicals
The admission that _some kind_ of being or substance must have always
existed in the universe, is the common property of all the systems of
philosophy. Materialist and idealist, theist and atheist, alike admit
it, but its admission is _theologically worthless_. 'The notion of a
God,' says Sir William Hamilton, in his admirable manner, 'is not
contained in the notion of a mere first cause; for, in the admission
of a first cause, atheist and theist are as one.' The being that is
assumed to exist is, therefore, a mere blank essence, a zero, an
'everything = nothing,' so far as this argument can carry us. Nature
remains a fathomless abyss, telling us nothing of its whence and
whither. It is still the fountain-head of inscrutable mystery, which
overshadows and overmasters us. The _natura naturata_ casts no light
on the _natura naturans_. The systole and diastole of the universe
goes on; the flux and reflux of its phenomena are endless. That
something always was, every one admits. The question between the rival
philosophic schools is as to what that something was and is. We may
choose to call it 'the first cause,' (an explanation which implies
that our notion of endless regression has broken down) and we may say
that we have reached the notion of an uncaused cause. But is that a
notion at all? Is it intelligible, conceivable? Do we not, in the very
assumption, bid farewell to reason, and fall back on some form of
faith?
Finally, the moment that supposed cause is reached, does not the
principle that was supposed to bring us to it break down? And by thus
destroying the bridge behind us, the very principle of casuality which
was valid in our progress and ascent, valid in the limited area of
experience--now emptied of all philosophical meaning when we desert
experience and rise to the transcendental--invalidates the whole
series of effects which are supposed to have sprung from it? We need
not rise above any single event, contingent and finite, to any other
event as the proximate cause of it; if, when we have essayed to carry
out the regress, we stop short, and, crying εὕρηκα, congratulate
ourselves that we have at length reached an uncaused cause.
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