But once more I would call attention to the fact that this entire manner of conceiving of things as “bodies,” and of movements as energies themselves, is quite legitimate on the part of the physicist so long as he remains a physicist. It only becomes illegitimate when, reaching out beyond the field of reactions, it seeks to get itself recognized as a world-theory--that is, when it would have actual processes “read” in accordance with the like scheme. For now there follows the claim one makes upon nature that all her action shall manifest itself mediately, as possible of being followed up in time and space. The illegitimate feature about this conception arises from the fact that it poses itself with an insoluble problem--the problem of telekinesis. If one regards things as “bodies” in the physical sense, and if upon this conception one insists on erecting a world-theory, then one has to solve the question: How can it ever be possible for action to take place between separate bodies?--a question which involves the idea that every effect produced by contact, even the very slightest, always presents itself to thought as a form of telekinesis. In other words: Everywhere effects are being produced, and yet one is unable to explain how they can ever be brought about. The insolubility of this problem is attributable not to things but to thinking; that is to say, it is a problem of a purely dialectical nature. In starting out from the conception “body” as a thing complete in itself, identical with itself, one cuts oneself off from the possibility of ever being able to explain how one thing can act upon another. In thought one has torn things out of their natural connection, and holds them fast conceptually in this artificial isolation. Once I make a thing a “body,” no power in the world can move it so as to bring it into contact with some other thing; as little so as any power in the world can impart movement to a reflected image, taken by itself. Just as such movement can only be brought about through movement of the object reflected, only from this can proceed, so contact between things can only take place, proceeding forth from the beholder, when he lets drop his false notions and comprehends actuality unmodified as that which it is--namely, _perpetual coming together into contact itself_. Actuality is verily nothing but the passing over from thing to thing--that is to say, process. Actuality is not, as science would fain have us believe, mere _possibility_--if so, it would always be necessary first to have explained how these possibilities could ever arrive at realization--but actuality is a _potency_, and so, at every moment of existence, self-realization itself. If only actuality is rightly conceived of, the question as to how action betwixt thing and thing can take place simply loses all meaning. Actuality is seen to be nothing but this action itself. Where one is, thither one cannot go; and what one is, that none can become.