The fiery ultimatum went on its way to Constantinople. The force to back it received fresh marching orders. Baron Manteuffel told Lord Bloomfield that Prince Gortschakoff had been appointed to command the Russian army on the frontier of Turkey; and that his horses and baggage had, on the 5th of June, already reached headquarters. A strong force of gunboats went up the Danube to Ismail to prepare a means of crossing the river, and the merchants at Odessa were warned to wind up their affairs. The Turks also were bent on making ready for the worst. The small squadron of Turkish men-of-war took up a position in the Black Sea mouth of the Bosphorus. A flying camp was established between the Black Sea and Kilia, and Omar Pasha was ordered to Shumla. But Varna was defenceless, and the works at the mouth of the Bosphorus were out of repair, and the guns worthless; and except the resistance which the Anglo-French fleet might offer, there was none which the navy and army of Nicholas could not overcome. The whole disposable force of the Sultan consisted of 80,000 men, mainly militia. In the face of the menacing preparation of Russia, the British Government did nothing but form a camp for 10,000 men at Chobham! For they did not believe in the outbreak of war. Lord Clarendon's despatches breathed of nothing but peace. The British Government could not shake off its old confidence in Nicholas, although he was in arms at the threshold of Constantinople. The policy of England, it was said, was "essentially pacific." No hostile feelings were entertained towards Russia, but every allowance was made for the difficulty in which the Emperor "had been placed"--by his own acts, in the main, the Foreign Secretary should have said. The British Government seemed to regard the threatened occupation of the Principalities as something inevitable, and while they still hoped to bring about a peaceful settlement, they did nothing and said nothing to prevent this further violation of right. It was a matter of course that they should appeal to the German Powers, telling them that France and Britain, in sending their fleets to Besika Bay, and in approving of the stand made by the Porte, were actuated by the sole desire to uphold Turkish independence, and begging them, especially Austria, to exert their influence upon the Czar in favour of peace. It is strange, indeed, that the British Ministers did not see the drift and persistency of Russia; and that, from the temper of the Czar, war was so probable that they could not do too much to place themselves in a position to bear a part becoming Britain. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe saw more distinctly. He told the Ministers that the master view of the Czar was to obtain a predominant influence over the counsels of the Porte, as a means of securing, if not hastening, its downfall; and he said rightly that if Turkey were to be left to struggle single-handed, the sooner the Porte were apprised of its helpless condition the better.