In the middle of September matters had come to a crisis. On the 22nd news arrived at Paris, in the shape of a telegraphic despatch from M. de la Cour, stating that the Porte was apprehensive of a "catastrophe," in consequence of the excitement among the Turkish population. The lives and properties of Europeans, and even the throne of the Sultan, were, in the opinion of the Grand Vizier, in danger. M. de la Cour also reported that he and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in order to afford protection to the Europeans, had ordered up four steamers from Besika Bay. This was very vague and indefinite news. It was alarming, because it was indefinite. No account of the affair was sent by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; and the British Government, to whom the news was reported, were compelled to rely upon the view of M. de la Cour. What should they do? The French Government, always eager for a movement of the fleet, at once proposed that in addition to the four steamers the whole of the united fleet should be directed to proceed to Constantinople. Count Walewski was instructed to request from Lord Clarendon an immediate decision, and was further to state that the Emperor's Government regarded the advance of the fleets as "indispensably necessary." The British Government agreed "without hesitation" to a course which Lord Palmerston had been urging for weeks, and orders went out at once from both capitals to Admiral Dundas and Admiral Hamelin. This was undoubtedly a serious step, as by the treaty of 1841 the Powers were prohibited from sending fleets within the Bosphorus in time of peace. Had the Government waited for the usual despatches of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, they would have seen that the danger reported by M. de la Cour disappeared very rapidly, and that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in describing the circumstances, took a cooler view of the dangers and did not even suggest the advance of the fleet. It may be doubted whether the British Government did not act with as much precipitation as M. de la Cour. For it cannot be denied that this fresh move of the fleet--a move so decisive, so completely pledging the two Powers to the defence of Turkey, and so irritating to Russia--lessened the chances of peace, if any were remaining.