When the Cavalry is working in combination with the other Arms the point of observation of its Commander must be connected with the latter by suitable relays, and officers must be sent out into those sections of the ground which cannot be overlooked from the position the Leader has selected. Combat and security patrols must be sent out in all directions from which the enemy's reserves or fresh bodies of his troops might approach, and even towards our own rear the ground must be reconnoitred as far as possible by officers, who report the result of their operations, not only to the superior Leader, but to the Brigade and Regimental Commanders. It will also be advisable to keep the officers of the other Arms, particularly of the reserves, as well informed as possible about the nature of the ground and the observed movements of the enemy's forces, so that these may always act with full knowledge of the circumstances. A General Staff Officer should be entrusted with the maintenance of communications with Army Headquarters itself. As the crisis approaches the troops must be drawn in nearer to the point of collision. As soon as the attack has been determined on, the Leader will be well advised to take up a position on the flank of his troops from which he will be able to overlook the whole field of action and keep the enemy well in view. From this point, having previously instructed his subordinates as to the situation and purpose of the coming combat, and having sent them back to their troops, he will despatch executive orders to the several echelons concerned. The line of attack must be defined with particular care, and a point of sight visible from a considerable distance must, if possible, be assigned to them. No room for doubt must be left open as to which troop it is which is responsible for the direction. But even with the finest system for reconnaissance and transmission of orders it will be impossible to guarantee the combined action of large 'Masses' for a common purpose, and to put them into the fight, in a thoroughly practical and not parade-ground fashion, unless good observation, able leading, and circulation of orders are combined with two other most important factors: First comes the utmost possible independence of the subordinate leaders, down to the limit of the Squadron Commander. Only when these can help one out in cases where an order fails to arrive, or where the circumstances compel a deviation from the letter of the order received, or where these can only be indicated by word of mouth, signs, bugle-calls, or even by riding in the required direction, can there be any guarantee that all will combine intelligently for the common purpose.