Either the Cavalry must clear the front of the Army in preparation for the battle, in which case it is not always a matter of free choice in which direction one has to clear off, nor can the Cavalry Commander from his standpoint always determine which wing of the battle front will have to manoeuvre; or it must close in from a flank for the decision, in which case the nearest wing is their natural destination. But they must always endeavour--and here I differ from General von Schlichting--to range themselves forwards and sidewards of their own Army. It will only be in cases where it is necessary to keep them in rear of the general alignment--as, for instance, it is proposed to use them as a last resort in the interests of the other Arms, as at Mars la Tour--or where the battle front itself is broken up by the nature of the ground or the grouping of the forces in such manner that the whole engagement is divided into a series of individual actions, as may often be the case in future Wars, that this rule must be departed from. Such dispositions are always less favourable because they imply in a certain degree defensive action, whereas when placed forward in the framework of the battle the offensive element of the Arm finds its fullest opportunity. That the desire to occupy such positions must not become stereotyped goes without saying; it must always be conditioned by the general and particular circumstances of the moment. The course of events may, indeed, require us to take up a position to the flank and rear of the Army, but fundamentally, forwards and to the flank, remains the most desirable disposition. In this position the Cavalry 'Masses' are best prepared to act against the enemy's flank, and can best combine the fire of their own Artillery concentrically with that of the guns and Infantry of the main body without losing their tactical connection, and thus divert the forces of the enemy into eccentric operations. Here they occupy the most suitable position to initiate without loss of time a parallel pursuit of the enemy, or to counter his attempts at pursuit; and here also they are best placed to accept the inevitable challenge of the enemy's Cavalry. General von Schlichting considers these combats as generally superfluous--a kind of family concern which affects the rival Cavalries only--having no connection with the ultimate decision between the two armies.[11] [Footnote 11: See 'Tactical and Strategical Principles of the Future,' p. 83. The view that Cavalry which has delivered one charge in the day is useless for the rest of the operations, I cannot accept. It finds no support in the facts of Military history--on the contrary, the most complete refutation.]