Here we are brought once more, in another form, to the question of the discrimination on account of color. Is this _legally reasonable_? Is it reasonable, in the exercise of a just discretion, to separate descendants of the African race from white children merely in consequence of descent? Passing over those principles of the Constitution and those provisions of Law which of themselves decide the question, constituting as they do _the highest reason_, but which have been already amply considered, look for a moment at the educational system of Massachusetts, and it will be seen that practically no discrimination of color is made by Law in any part of it. A descendant of the African race may be Governor of the Commonwealth, and as such, with the advice and consent of the Council, may select the Board of Education. As Lieutenant-Governor, he may be _ex officio_ a member of the Board. He may be Secretary of the Board, with the duty imposed on him by law of seeing "that _all_ children in this Commonwealth, who depend upon Common Schools for instruction, may have the best education which those schools can be made to impart."[39] He may be member of any School Committee, or teacher in any Common School of the State. As legal voter, he can vote in the selection of any School Committee. [39] General Laws of Massachusetts, 1837, Ch. 241, sec. 2. Thus, in every department connected with our Common Schools, throughout the whole hierarchy of their government, from the very head of the system down to the humblest usher in the humblest Primary School, and to the humblest voter, there is no distinction of color known to the law. It is when we reach the last stage of all, the children themselves, that the beautiful character of the system is changed to the deformity of Caste, as, in the picture of the ancient poet, what above was a lovely woman terminated below in a vile, unsightly fish. And all this is done by the School Committee, with more than necromantic power, in the exercise of a mere discretion. It is clear that the Committee may classify scholars according to age and sex, for the obvious reasons that these distinctions are inoffensive, and that they are especially recognized as _legal_ in the law relating to schools.[40] They may also classify scholars according to moral and intellectual qualifications, because such a power is necessary to the government of schools. But the Committee cannot assume, _a priori_, and without individual examination, that all of an _entire race_ are so deficient in proper moral and intellectual qualifications as to justify their universal degradation to a class by themselves. Such an exercise of discretion must be unreasonable, and therefore illegal. [40] Revised Statutes, Ch. 23, sec. 63. * * * * * SEPARATE SCHOOL NOT AN EQUIVALENT FOR COMMON SCHOOL.