Perhaps I ought to anticipate an objection from the other side, to the effect that these national losses, whether from the destruction of our commerce, the prolongation of the war, or the expense of the blockade, are indirect and remote, so as not to be a just ground of claim. This is expressed at the Common Law by the rule that “damages must be for the natural and proximate consequence of an act.”[86] To this excuse the answer is explicit. The damages suffered by the United States are twofold, individual and national, being in each case direct and proximate, although in the one case individuals suffered, and in the other case the nation. It is easy to see that there may be occasions, where, overtopping all individual damages, are damages suffered by the nation, so that reparation to individuals would be insufficient. Nor can the claim of the nation be questioned simply because it is large, or because the evidence with regard to it is different from that in the case of an individual. In each case the damage must be proved by the best possible evidence, and this is all that law or reason can require. In the case of the nation the evidence is historic; and this is enough. Impartial history will record the national losses from British intervention, and it is only reasonable that the evidence of these losses should not be excluded from judgment. Because the case is without precedent, because no nation ever before received such injury from a friendly power, this can be no reason why the question should not be considered on the evidence. Even the rule of the Common Law furnishes no impediment; for our damages are the natural consequence of what was done. But the rule of the Roman Law, which is the rule of International Law, is broader than that of the Common Law. The measure of damages, according to the Digest, is, “Whatever may have been lost or might have been gained,”--_Quantum mihi abest, quantumque lucrari potui_;[87] and this same rule seems to prevail in the French Law, borrowed from the Roman Law.[88] This rule opens the door to ample reparation for all damages, whether individual or national. There is another rule of the Common Law, in harmony with strict justice, which is applicable in the case. I find it in the law relating to _Nuisances_, which provides that there may be two distinct proceedings,--first, in behalf of individuals, and, secondly, in behalf of the community. Obviously, reparation to individuals does not supersede reparation to the community. The proceeding in the one case is by action at law, and in the other by indictment. The reason assigned by Blackstone for the latter is, “Because, the damage being common to all the king’s subjects, no one can assign his particular proportion of it.”[89] But this is the very case with regard to damages sustained by the nation. A familiar authority furnishes an additional illustration, which is precisely in point:--