China's Revolution, 1911-1912: A Historical and Political Record of the Civil WarDingle, Edwin John
History
China's Revolution, 1911-1912: A Historical and Political Record of the Civil War
Dingle, Edwin John
China -- History -- Revolution, 1911-1912
One must not expect, however, simply because Li would not talk peace
that he was strong enough to enforce peace. He was not. As soon as
Li's letter went {96} back to Yuan there was activity in the Imperial
camp, soldiers were to be seen moving away towards Hanyang, batteries
were shifted, trenching went on apace, a pontoon bridge was started
by the Imperialists across the Han and knocked to pieces by the
Hanyang Revolutionary guns, and it seemed as if a battle was
immediately imminent. And then it commenced again. One cannot
describe the conditions. The war was brought to our very doors.
Fellows had bullets whizzing in their bedrooms, shells dropped all
over the Foreign Concessions. It was never safe to be out on the
Bund or in the roads of the settlement. Revolutionists were dying in
thousands. All hospitals were full. The country was in utter
devastation.
Up to an early hour on November 10th fighting still raged more or
less fiercely. It was generally stated that the Revolutionists gave
the enemy a thoroughly bad time, and had taken up an advanced
position. The bombardment of Wuchang was hourly expected.
Immediately behind the British Concession, not more than a hundred
yards from the road dividing British from Chinese territory, three
big guns of the Imperialists had their noses cocked most
threateningly towards the capital city, and every one settled down to
wait. A peculiar turn of events now was the organisation of night
attacks. Invariably one's dinner hour was ushered in by the booming
of cannon from either side of the river. But during these days the
Imperialists again began indubitably to show their superiority as a
fighting force. The great drawback of the Republican Army was that
it was largely made up of nondescripts, as ignorant of warfare as is
possible to imagine, whilst in the Northern Army there were none but
highly trained men in whom were instilled strongly the absorbing
lessons of the army. They knew nothing else. They did nothing else.
They were fighting machines, and they fought on the same principle as
machines in good order work. In making this {97} statement I am
perfectly aware that there are certain great weaknesses in the
Chinese military organisation that have yet to be removed. But with
the Northern Army, that army which was founded by Yuan Shih K'ai
himself--and he was looked upon as the greatest military reformer of
the time--it had the minimum of these defects. The fact that the
army of each province is for all practical purposes a separate body
tells against efficiency. And it follows that the army that Yuan
created, and which was now mainly engaged in fighting the
Revolutionary enemy, was not so much a branch of the Chinese Army,
but Yuan's Army, moulded as he wanted it. His soldiers, first of
all, had been taught loyalty. What other soldiers in the world would
have stood the test of loyalty as did those northern soldiers during
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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