This, I think, is the place to suggest that a proposal which I
previously put forward as a provisional assumption should be taken
in earnest. In the latest analytical literature[32] a predilection
has been shown for the view that any kind of privation, any thwarted
instinctual gratification, results in a heightening of the sense of
guilt, or may do so. I believe one obtains a great simplification
of theory if one regards this as valid _only_ for the aggressive
instincts, and that little will be found to contradict this assumption.
How then is it to be explained dynamically and economically that
a heightening of the sense of guilt should appear in place of
an unfulfilled erotic desire? This can surely only happen in a
roundabout way: the thwarting of the erotic gratification provokes an
access of aggressiveness against the person who interfered with the
gratification, and then this tendency to aggression in its turn has
itself to be suppressed. So then it is, after all, only the aggression
which is changed into guilt, by being suppressed and made over to
the super-ego. I am convinced that very many processes will admit of
much simpler and clearer explanation if we restrict the findings of
psycho-analysis in respect of the origin of the sense of guilt to the
aggressive instincts. Reference to the clinical material here gives
us no unequivocal answer, because, according to our own hypothesis,
the two kinds of instincts hardly ever appear in a pure form, unmixed
with each other; but the investigation of extreme cases would probably
point in the direction I anticipate. I am tempted to extract our
first advantage from this narrower conception by applying it to the
repression-process. The symptoms of neurosis, as we have learnt, are
essentially substitutive gratifications for unfulfilled sexual wishes.
In the course of our analytic work we have found to our surprise that
perhaps every neurosis masks a certain amount of unconscious sense of
guilt, which in its turn reinforces the symptoms by exploiting them as
punishment. One is now inclined to suggest the following statement as a
possible formulation: when an instinctual trend undergoes repression,
its libidinal elements are transformed into symptoms and its aggressive
components into a sense of guilt. Even if this statement is only
accurate as an approximation it merits our interest.
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