Closing In: Marines in the Seizure of Iwo JimaAlexander, Joseph H.
History
Closing In: Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jima
Alexander, Joseph H.
Iwo Jima, Battle of, Japan, 1945; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- World War, 1939-1945
[Illustration: _The positions from which rocket troops launched salvos
of 4.5-inch rockets became very unhealthy places, indeed, as Japanese
artillery and mortars zeroed in on the clouds of smoke and dust
resulting from the firing of the rockets._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 111100
]
]
[Sidebar (page 44): Amphibious Logistical Support at Iwo Jima
The logistical effort required to sustain the seizure of Iwo Jima was
enormous, complex, largely improvised on lessons learned in earlier
Marine Corps operations in the Pacific, and highly successful. Clearly,
no other element of the emerging art of amphibious warfare had improved
so greatly by the winter of 1945. Marines may have had the heart and
firepower to tackle a fortress-like Iwo Jima earlier in the war, but
they would have been crippled in the doing of it by limitations in
amphibious logistical support capabilities. These concepts, procedures,
organizations, and special materials took years to develop; once in
place they fully enabled such large-scale conquests as Iwo Jima and
Okinawa.
For the Iwo Jima operation, VAC had the 8th Field Depot, commanded
by Colonel Leland S. Swindler. The depot was designed to serve as
the nucleus of the shore party operation; the depot commander was
dual-hatted as the Shore Party Commander of the Landing Force, in
which capacity he was responsible for coordinating the activities of
the division shore parties. The timing of the logistics support at Iwo
Jima proved to be well conceived and executed. Liaison teams from the
8th Field Depot accompanied the 4th and 5th Divisions ashore. On D+3,
units of the field depot came ashore, and two days after this, when VAC
assumed control on shore, the field depot took over and the unloading
continued without interruption.
The V Amphibious Corps at Iwo Jima used every conceivable means of
delivering combat cargo ashore when and where needed by the landing
force. These means sequentially involved the prescribed loads and
units of fire carried by the assault waves; “hot cargo” preloaded
in on-call waves or floating dumps; experimental use of “one-shot”
preloaded amphibious trailers and Wilson drums; general unloading;
administrative unloading of what later generations of amphibians
would call an “assault follow-on echelon”; and aerial delivery of
critically short items, first by parachute, then by transports landing
on the captured runways. In the process, the Navy-Marine Corps team
successfully experimented with the use of armored bulldozers and sleds
loaded with hinged Marston matting delivered in the assault waves to
help clear wheeled vehicles stuck in the soft volcanic sand. In spite
of formidable early obstacles--foul weather, heavy surf, dangerous
undertows, and fearsome enemy fire--the system worked. Combat cargo
flowed in; casualties and salvaged equipment flowed out.
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