Of entirely different kind and nature is the series of causes pertaining to the production of objects of art. In their capacity of purpose they are themselves the physical cause of all the work that precedes their birth. When the product of art is finally ready, the effect has then gone before the cause. Such a connection is called teleological causality in contradistinction to the mechanical one, where the cause always precedes the effect. But although the product of art is the nearest cause of its own production, it is not the primary one; it is itself the result, not of a cause to be found in the material world, but of a _foreign_ interference in the mechanical causality, and points therefore to a supernatural ground which, by a closer investigation, will be found identical with a living will. The will feels the want of other things than those which natural forces can spontaneously produce. Natural products act as incentives on the will, spur it to break through mechanical causality so that physical laws by a judicious guidance may be forced to produce artificial products that better satisfy the desires of the will. If natural laws could comprehend and judge these things, they would consider them all as miracles, whereas, from the point of view of the will, they are so much the more natural as they are exact expressions of the needs and desires of the will. But not only the order of cause and effect, even the tie between the two is entirely different in teleological causality from that in mechanical. While the natural product is an effect that cannot fail to appear, the product of art, on the contrary, is an effect that primarily never could be expected, because it has no cause in the material world; but further, if it is forthcoming, the tie between cause and effect is so loose that such a product may be left and will remain in any stage of its production. It may be just commenced, half ready, or nearly completed; be better or worse, be a failure, and so on, whereas the natural product springs forth of physical necessity from its cause and never can be different from what it is. Wills and physical forces then stand against each other as two fundamentally and radically different causes. A will may neglect to do what it ought to, may be idle, industrious, undecided; a physical force cannot leave undone what it has to do, can never be called idle, industrious or undecided. That man is able to produce objects of art we have sufficient evidence in material invention, from the simple stone-ax up to the most complicated machines. But if man can create products of art he must himself be a supernatural cause, as natural products produce nothing but their own kind. And not only he but also the beings that build up his organism must be supernatural causes, as we have seen that all organic matter _ipso facto_ are products of art.