They broke down, at the beginning of the campaign, at Goldberg, Kulm, and in the pursuit after the battle of Katzbach; it was not until Wartenburg and Möckern, and after they had been very much diminished in the process, that they had become thoroughly efficient troops. Scharnhorst, their creator, had not originally contemplated the employment of the Landwehr as a troop of the first line. It was only necessity which led to the enrolment of the Landwehr among the field-troops; just as in August, 1914, necessity compelled the German command to throw in on the right wing of the Western army troops which were not yet fully trained. The zeal of reformers, after the defeats of the year 1806, undoubtedly contributed to make the difference between the old and the new in the Prussian army appear much greater than it actually was. Scharnhorst and his disciples frequently overshot the mark deliberately, in order to attain their purpose, for they were under the necessity of overcoming a host of prejudices on the part of those who adhered to the externals of the Frederician tradition, and not to its inner significance. This, however, does not in any way alter the fact that it was really the resuscitated old Prussian army, though filled with an entirely new spirit, that we have to thank for the liberation of 1813. It was the same much-abused officers' corps, the "Junkers" of the year 1806, who led to victory an army the best parts of which were composed of veteran soldiers. The great achievements of the army of 1813 in the face of the enemy were due to the excellence of its _cadres_, and the same was the case a century later. The achievements of the War of Liberation, like our ability to hold out in the World War, were only rendered possible by the fact that a sufficient number of experienced officers and veteran soldiers were available, for even the men of the home and reserve regiments of 1813 had for the most part already served in the old army.