§ 357. Definition serves the practical purpose of enabling us mentally
to distinguish, or, as the name implies, 'mark off' the thing defined
from all other things whatsoever. This may seem at first an endless
task, but there is a short cut by which the goal may be reached. For,
if we distinguish the thing in hand from the things which it is most
like, we shall, 'a fortiori,' have distinguished it from things to
which it bears a less resemblance.
§ 358. Hence the first thing to do in seeking for a definition is to
fix upon the class into which the thing to be defined most naturally
falls, and then to distinguish the thing in question from the other
members of that class. If we were asked to define a triangle, we
would not begin by distinguishing it from a hawser, but from a square
and other figures with which it is more possible to confound it. The
class into which a thing falls is called its Genus, and the attribute
or attributes which distinguish it from other members of that class
are called its Difference.
§ 359. If definition thus consists in referring a thing to a class, we
see a further reason why the summum genus of all things cannot be
defined.
§ 360. We have said that definition is useful in enabling us to
distinguish things from one another in our minds: but this must not be
regarded as the direct object of the process. For this object may be
accomplished without giving a definition at all, by means of what is
called a Description. By a description is meant an enumeration of
accidents with or without the mention of some class-name. It is as
applicable to proper names as to common terms. When we say 'John Smith
lives next door on the right-hand side and passes by to his office
every morning at nine o'clock,' we have, in all probability,
effectually distinguished John Smith from other people: but living
next, &c., cannot be part of the intension of John Smith, since John
Smith may change his residence or abandon his occupation without
ceasing to be called by his name. Indirectly then definition serves
the purpose of distinguishing things in the mind, but its direct
object is to unfold the intension of terms, and so impart precision to
our thoughts by setting plainly before us the meaning of the words we
are using.
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