England, Canada and the Great WarDesjardins, L. G. (Louis Georges)
History
England, Canada and the Great War
Desjardins, L. G. (Louis Georges)
Great Britain -- Colonies -- Canada; Imperialism; World War, 1914-1918; World War, 1914-1918 -- Canada
Whenever representatives of the belligerents shall meet to negotiate for
peace, there will of course be many questions of first class importance
to consider and discuss. But the one which must overshadow any other and
of necessity carry the day, is that peace must be restored under
conditions that will, if not forever, at least for many long years,
protect Humanity and Civilization against a recurrence of such a
calamity as ambitious and cruel Germany has criminally imposed upon the
world. I urged my French Canadian readers to consider seriously how
peace due to a compromise, accepted out of sheer discouragement, would
soon develop into a still more trying ordeal than the one Canada had
willingly and deliberately undertaken to fight out with the Allies. I
forcibly explained to them that if the present war did not result in an
international agreement to put an end to the extravagant and ruinous
militarism which, under Prussian terrorism, was proving to be the curse
of almost the whole universe, all the sacrifices of so many millions of
lives, heroically given, of untold sufferings, of so much treasures,
would have been made in vain if Germany was allowed to continue a
permanent menace to general tranquillity.
It was a wonder to me that any one could fail to understand that an
armed peace would be only a truce during which militarism would be
spreading with increased vigour and strength. It was evident--and still
daily becoming more and more so--that Germany would only consent to it
with the determination to renew, on a still much larger scale, her
military organization with the purpose of a more gigantic effort at
universal domination.
Then was it not plain that labouring under the inevitable necessity of
such an international situation, the Allied nations,--the British Empire
as much as France, the United States and Italy--would by force be
obliged to make the sacrifices required to maintain their military
systems in such a state of efficiency as to be always ready to face
their ambitious foe with good prospects of success. Such being the
undeniable case, I affirmed--I am sure with the best of reasons--that
Great Britain could not return to her ante-war policy of the enlistment
of only a small standing territorial army, trusting as formerly to her
Naval strength for her defence and the safe maintenance of her prestige
and power. Like all the continental nations, England would have to incur
the very heavy cost of keeping millions of men always fully armed.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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