[35] Of which all that need be said in this essay is that it also can be conceived as functional, and defined in terms of transitions, or of the possibility of such. [Cf. _Principles of Psychology_, vol. I, pp. 473-480, vol. II, pp. 337-340; _Pragmatism_, p. 265; _Some Problems of Philosophy_, pp. 63-74; _Meaning of Truth_, pp. 246-247, etc. ED.] [36] [Cf. below, pp. 93 ff.] [37] [Cf. "How Two Minds Can Know One Thing," below, pp. 123-136.] [38] The notion that our objects are inside of our respective heads is not seriously defensible, so I pass it by. [39] [The argument is resumed below, pp. 101 sq. ED.] [40] Our minds and these ejective realities would still have space (or pseudo-space, as I believe Professor Strong calls the medium of interaction between 'things-in-themselves') in common. These would exist _where_, and begin to act _where_, we locate the molecules, etc., and _where_ we perceive the sensible phenomena explained thereby. [Cf. Morton Prince: _The Nature of Mind, and Human Automatism_, part I, ch. III, IV; C. A. Strong: _Why the Mind Has a Body_, ch. XII.] [41] [Cf. below, p. 188; _A Pluralistic Universe_, Lect. IV-VII.] [42] I have said something of this latter alliance in an article entitled 'Humanism and Truth,' in _Mind_, October, 1904. [Reprinted in _The Meaning of Truth_, pp. 51-101. Cf. also "Humanism and Truth Once More," below, pp. 244-265.] III THE THING AND ITS RELATIONS[43] Experience in its immediacy seems perfectly fluent. The active sense of living which we all enjoy, before reflection shatters our instinctive world for us, is self-luminous and suggests no paradoxes. Its difficulties are disappointments and uncertainties. They are not intellectual contradictions. When the reflective intellect gets at work, however, it discovers incomprehensibilities in the flowing process. Distinguishing its elements and parts, it gives them separate names, and what it thus disjoins it can not easily put together. Pyrrhonism accepts the irrationality and revels in its dialectic elaboration. Other philosophies try, some by ignoring, some by resisting, and some by turning the dialectic procedure against itself, negating its first negations, to restore the fluent sense of life again, and let redemption take the place of innocence. The perfection with which any philosophy may do this is the measure of its human success and of its importance in philosophic history. In [the last essay], 'A World of Pure Experience,' I tried my own hand sketchily at the problem, resisting certain first steps of dialectics by insisting in a general way that the immediately experienced conjunctive relations are as real as anything else. If my sketch is not to appear too _naïf_, I must come closer to details, and in the present essay I propose to do so. I