Essays in Zen Buddhism : $b First seriesSuzuki, Daisetz Teitaro
Religion
Essays in Zen Buddhism : $b First series
Suzuki, Daisetz Teitaro
Zen Buddhism
The purport of these adjectives and phrases is that no conceptual
interpretation is possible of Enlightenment or self-realisation and
that the realisation must issue from one’s own inner consciousness,
independent of scriptural teaching or of another’s help. For all
that is needed to lead one to the attainment of Pratyātmāryajñāna is
within oneself, only that it is in a state of confusion owing to wrong
judgments (_vikalpa_) cherished and infused (_vāsanā_) in the mind
since beginningless time. It requires a direct, personal confirmation
or transmission from the Buddhas, but even these latter are unable to
awaken us to the exalted state of Enlightenment unless we ourselves
concentrate our spiritual efforts in the work of self-emancipation.
Therefore, meditation (_dhyāna_) is recommended in the Sutra as the
means of attaining to the truth of the inmost consciousness.
The idea of dhyana as explained in the _Laṅkāvatāra_, however, is
different from what we generally know in Hinayana literature,[f45]
that is, from those kinds of dhyana mentioned in the previous part
of this essay. The Sutra distinguishes four dhyanas: the first is
practised by the unlearned (_bālopacārika_), such as the Śrāvakas,
Pratyeka-buddhas, and devotees of the Yoga. They have been instructed
in the doctrine of nonātman, and regarding the world as impermanent,
impure, and pain-producing, they persistently follow these thoughts
until they realise the samadhi of thought-extinction. The second
dhyana is designated “statement-reviewing” (_artha-pravicaya_) by
which is meant an intellectual examination of statements or
propositions, Buddhist or non-Buddhist, such as “Each object has its
individual marks,” “There is no personal Atman,” “Things are created
by an external agency,” or “things are mutually determined”; and after
the examination of these themes the practiser of this dhyana turns
his thought on the non-atman-ness of things (_dharma-nairātmya_) and
on the characteristic features of the various stages (_bhūmi_) of
Bodhisattvaship, and finally in accordance with the sense involved
therein he goes on with his contemplative examination. The third dhyana
is called “Attaching oneself to Thatness” (_tathatālambana_) whereby
one realises that to discriminate the two forms of non-atman-ness
is still due to an analytical speculation and that when things are
truthfully (_yathābhūtam_) perceived, no such analysis is possible,
for then there obtains absolute oneness only. The fourth and last is
“Tathāgata-dhyāna.” In this one enters into the stage of Buddhahood
where he enjoys a threefold beatitude belonging to the noble
understanding of self-realisation and performs wonderful deeds for the
sake of all sentient beings. In these dhyanas we observe a gradual
perfection of Buddhist life culminating in the utmost spiritual freedom
of Buddhahood, which is above all intellectual conditions and beyond
the reach of relative consciousness. Those wonderful, unthinkable
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