Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy
Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.
Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy; Political science; Science
Not only must abstract mathematics have made some progress, but
concrete mathematics also. It is scarcely possible that the buildings
belonging to this era should have been laid out and erected without
any knowledge of geometry. At any rate, there must have existed that
elementary geometry which deals with direct {50} measurement—with the
apposition of lines; and it seems that only after the discovery of
those simple proceedings, by which right angles are drawn, and relative
positions fixed, could so regular an architecture be executed. In the
case of the other division of concrete mathematics—mechanics, we have
definite evidence of progress. We know that the lever and the inclined
plane were employed during this period: implying that there was a
qualitative prevision of their effects, if not a quantitative one.
But we know more. We read of weights in the earliest records; and we
find weights in ruins of the highest antiquity. Weights imply scales,
of which we have also mention; and scales involve the primary theorem
of mechanics in its least complicated form—involve not a qualitative
but a quantitative prevision of mechanical effects. And here we may
notice how mechanics, in common with the other exact sciences, took
its rise from the simplest application of the idea of _equality_. For
the mechanical proposition which the scales involve, is, that if a
lever with _equal_ arms, have _equal_ weights suspended from them, the
weights will remain at _equal_ altitudes. And we may further notice
how, in this first step of rational mechanics, we see illustrated the
truth awhile since named, that as magnitudes of linear extension are
the only ones of which the equality is exactly ascertainable, the
equalities of other magnitudes have at the outset to be determined by
means of them. For the equality of the weights which balance each other
in scales, depends on the equality of the arms: we can know that the
weights are equal only by proving that the arms are equal. And when
by this means we have obtained a system of weights,—a set of equal
units of force and definite multiples of them, then does a science of
mechanics become possible. Whence, indeed, it follows, that rational
mechanics could not possibly have any other starting-point than the
scales.
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