Greece and the Allies, 1914-1922Abbott, G. F. (George Frederick)
History
Greece and the Allies, 1914-1922
Abbott, G. F. (George Frederick)
Greece -- Foreign relations; Greece -- Politics and government -- 1913-1917; World War, 1914-1918 -- Greece
The King replied: "You know I recognize that I am bound to obey the
popular verdict when it is a question of the internal affairs of the
country; but when it is a question of foreign affairs--the great
national questions--my view is that, so long as I consider a thing
right or wrong, I must insist that it shall or shall not be done,
because I feel responsible before God."
At this utterance, M. Venizelos narrates, "I remember that a feeling of
distress came over me, and with clasped hands, I shook my head in a
melancholy manner, saying: 'Alas! we are before the theory of kingship
by the grace of God: poor Greece!'" [7] After a little, he told the
King that, in the actual circumstances, he could not undertake a
struggle for the Constitution; he could only tender his resignation.
The King expostulated: "How can you resign in the face of a Bulgarian
mobilization? In these circumstances, as you know, we must not delay
even twenty-four hours. After all, who assures us that Bulgaria will
attack Servia? It is possible that she may maintain an armed
neutrality; in which case our disagreement vanishes, and you can stay
in power and carry on your policy." Whereupon M. Venizelos withdrew
his resignation.
Of course, he was not deluded by the Sofia Government's {55}
announcement of "armed neutrality," and he was determined to go for
Bulgaria at once. But how? In his own mind, as he had already
demonstrated to the King, no doubt existed that, if the Greeks attacked
the Bulgars, they had every chance of crushing them and even of taking
their capital. But there was that General Staff by whose opinions the
King set such store. They objected Servia's inability to contribute,
as she was bound by her Military Convention to do, 150,000 combatants.
Therefore, in order to meet this objection, he said: "Don't you think
we might ask the English and the French whether they could not furnish
150,000 combatants of their own?"
"Certainly," replied the King; "but they must send Metropolitan
(European) troops, not Colonials."
By his own account, M. Venizelos did not take this as meaning that the
King had agreed, if the English and the French supplied these
reinforcements, to depart from neutrality. He left Tatoi with a clear
perception of the divergence between their respective points of view:
while they both concurred in the need of instant mobilization, one was
for a defensive and the other for an offensive policy; but, as soon
appeared, not without hopes of converting his sovereign by some means
or other.
A busy, ambitious child of fortune never lets the grass grow under his
feet:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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