Greece and the Allies, 1914-1922Abbott, G. F. (George Frederick)
History
Greece and the Allies, 1914-1922
Abbott, G. F. (George Frederick)
Greece -- Foreign relations; Greece -- Politics and government -- 1913-1917; World War, 1914-1918 -- Greece
Such were the circumstances under which the Allies landed at Salonica.
Their action has been pronounced immoral and perfidious by some English
and even by some French critics; and as it was attended with ill
success, it brought double shame upon the contrivers.[18] Certainly,
it will not bear investigation from the standpoint of political tact:
it was the first of the many performances which little by little
alienated a friendly nation from them and discredited M. Venizelos with
his countrymen.
[1] M. Venizelos in the _Nea Hellas_, 22 March (O.S.), 1915.
[2] _Ibid._
[3] Deville, p. 174.
[4] Venizelos to Greek Legation, Nish, 18/31 Aug.; Alexandropoulos,
Nish, 19 Aug./1 Sept.; 20 Aug./2 Sept.; 22 Aug./4 Sept., 1915.
[5] _White Book_, No. 41.
[6] _Orations_, pp. 131-8.
[7] This utterance, for the exactness of which we have to rely entirely
on M. Venizelos's memory, was the origin of the charge henceforth
brought against King Constantine that he claimed to reign by Divine
Right.
[8] According to another and ampler version of these events, it had
been agreed between the King and M. Venizelos that, while the latter
opened conversations with the British and French Ministers about the
possibility of sending 150,000 combatants, the former should
simultaneously open conversations with the German Emperor relating the
steps taken in regard to the Entente, and asking what Germany would
give for Greek neutrality. But when M. Venizelos returned to Athens,
he sent a letter to the King informing him that he had changed his mind
and that, as a responsible Minister, he could not sanction the
projected negotiations with Germany. Whereupon the King forwarded by
M. Mercati a reply that, in such a case, he retracted the permission to
approach the Entente with regard to reinforcements. See the _Balkan
Review_, Dec., 1920, pp. 387-8. Yet another version supplies some
additional details: M. Venizelos assured M. Mercati that his _demarche_
was of a strictly personal character and did not commit the State in
the least; next day he repeated this assurance to the King himself and,
at the King's instance, promised to cancel the _demarche_; and two days
afterwards the French Minister, M. Guillemin, formally declared to the
King that M. Venizelos's _demarche_ was considered as null and
void--_nulle et non avenue_.--See S. Cosmin's _Diplomatic et Presse
dans l'Affaire Grecque_ (Paris, 1921), pp. 123-4.
[9] The Greek Ministers abroad had for some time been informing their
Government of a contemplated occupation by Allied troops of the
territories which were to be ceded to Bulgaria; and the suspicion that
a dispatch of Entente Forces to Salonica might have for its object
"really to occupy for Bulgaria, until the conclusion of peace, the
territories coveted by her," has been expressed even by a French
diplomat.--See Deville, p. 129, n. 1.
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