Exceptional measures had to be taken to maintain the exchange rates with the United States from whom the chief purchases were made. Large amounts of gold were exported, but by June, 1915, there was a collapse in American exchange. Drastic measures were used to induce the holders of American securities in England to sell or lend those securities to the Government. In this way exchange was kept up practically to the gold point. This question of exchange and the position of England as the director of the financial campaign of the Allies is illustrated from an address given by Mr. R. H. Brand to the American Bankers Association, in September, 1917: "Of course no nation could permanently tolerate such unfavorable trade balances as those from which the Allies in Europe are now suffering. They can only do so now and keep their exchanges with the United States steady by borrowing immense sums here. But the war itself is not permanent, and the question is merely whether the present state of affairs can be continued long enough to enable all the enemies of the Central Powers to exert their full strength and win a final victory. "You will no doubt all have noticed that the credits granted Great Britain have been greater than those granted to any other Ally. The reasons are simple, though they are not, I think, generally understood. We have, in the first place, the largest war and munition program of any Ally; in the second place, as I have shown above, we are, with the exception of the United States, the greatest industrial arsenal among the Allies; that necessarily involves large imports. We send a great deal of steel from England to our Allies; we have to replace it by steel from here. We make rifles for Russia; we have to import the steel to make them. We send boots to Russia; we have to import the leather needed. These examples might be multiplied many times. Thirdly, we extend large credits in England to our Allies, some part of which they may use anywhere in the world, and this part may ultimately come back on the sterling exchange in New York. Lastly, it is well known that neutrals who are owed money by England unfortunately find it convenient to utilize the sterling exchange in New York in order to recoup themselves in dollars. But so also do neutrals who are owed money by the other Allies. So long as we maintain the sterling exchange this appears to be inevitable, and the burden of financing both our own and our Allies' trade tends to fall on that exchange. It is by our maintenance of this sterling exchange that the continuance of our Allies' trade is rendered possible. The maintenance of the sterling exchange means the maintenance of the allied exchanges. All these factors together exert an immense influence. If England had had only herself to