Historical Record of the Thirty-sixth, or the Herefordshire Regiment of Foot: containing an account of the formation of the regiment in 1701, and of its subsequent services to 1852Cannon, Richard
History
Historical Record of the Thirty-sixth, or the Herefordshire Regiment of Foot: containing an account of the formation of the regiment in 1701, and of its subsequent services to 1852
Cannon, Richard
Great Britain. Army. Herefordshire Light Infantry -- History; Great Britain. Army. Regiment of Foot, 36th -- History
When the cannonade ceased, every assistance was given to the
wounded; from the situation of the baggage and stores no
refreshment could be procured for the men except a dram of arrack,
the cattle carrying water for the men having been mostly killed,
and the drivers fearing to come to the lines, water was much
wanted. A council of war was held during the night, in which
it was agreed to force a way through the enemy’s lines about
three o’clock in the morning of the 14th of September, and join
Major-General (afterwards Sir William) Medows, to whom information
had been sent on the night of the 12th or morning of the 13th.
Every endeavour was made to repair the two twelve-pounders, and
settle the other guns so as to move; the want of cattle was so
great that it was impossible to draw all the guns; the baggage
was searched, and all the private draught bullocks that could be
obtained were brought to the lines, but on trial would not move the
guns. The necessary instructions were given for the march, which
was to take place, from the left, in the following manner:--The
grenadiers of the THIRTY-SIXTH regiment to lead, provided with
instruments for spiking the enemy’s guns; the Twenty-fifth Native
battalion next, then the Fifth battalion; the battalion companies
of the THIRTY-SIXTH regiment; the Sixteenth and First Native
battalions; the light company of the THIRTY-SIXTH regiment in the
rear. The cavalry were to march in a separate column on the left.
The sixteenth battalion of sepoys was ordered to be withdrawn from
the fort about twelve at night, but did not arrive until five, to
which may be attributed the engagement on the 14th, as the troops
would otherwise have been two hours’ march in advance of the enemy.
It was only found possible to repair one of the twelve-pounders,
and that with much exertion; upon collecting all the bullocks that
could be obtained, the eighteen-pounder, two six-pounders, and
two tumbrils were obliged to be left on the ground, besides the
broken down twelve-pounder; one wheel of the eighteen-pounder had
been much damaged, as was the timber, and one of the six-pounders;
unfortunately the followers, the people with the baggage, and the
wounded, who were moved behind one of the hills in the rear, being
out of danger, were not properly informed of the intended march,
and were left almost to the mercy of the enemy’s horse. The first
they knew of the movement was seeing the line in motion, and every
one then endeavoured to make the best of his way to it; some of
the dooly-men ran off, as did most of the followers, leaving the
sick and a great portion of the baggage on the ground; when it was
sufficiently light, it was perceived that the enemy had left the
position occupied by him during the night. The British line moved
off about five o’clock, and was obliged to lift the guns on by
hand, which caused the troops to get on very slowly. Before the
ground had been well quitted, it was covered by the enemy’s troops,
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