It would be a grateful task to record humanity or chivalry as the motive for the concession; and it would be the duty of history to assign it, in the absence of facts, inconsistent with such a conclusion. But the victor, by his own confession, has precluded such a presumption.[37] In a letter of General Washington’s to Don Francisco Rendon, agent of the Spanish government in the United States, written at “Headquarters before Yorktown, twelfth of October, 1781,” occurs the following: “I am obliged by the extract of General Galvez’s letter to Count de Grasse, explaining at large _the necessity_ he was under of granting the terms of capitulation to the garrison at Pensacola, which the commandant _required_. I have no doubt, from General Galvez’s well known attachment to the cause of America, that he would have refused the articles, which have been deemed exceptionable, had there not been very powerful reasons to induce his acceptance of them.” What, it may be asked, were “those very powerful reasons?” He had an army at his command only one thousand less in number than General Washington had before Yorktown, when he wrote the letter to Rendon; he had ample supplies of every description; he was backed by a powerful fleet; he had selected for his expedition a time when de Grasse’s movements on the Atlantic coast required the presence, in that quarter, of the whole British naval force on this side of the Atlantic; and hence, we can find no “necessity he was under of granting terms,” which General Campbell “required,” unless we find it in his want of faith in his ability by force of arms, to compel the British commander to modify his requirements. In order to fully appreciate the transaction, it should be borne in mind that there was an understanding between Galvez and the French commanders in America, that he should not grant to British troops that might fall into his power during his operations in West Florida, such terms as would enable them to become a part of the armies operating against the United States. This understanding Galvez violated at Baton Rouge and Mobile, and again for the third time, in conceding the terms demanded by General Campbell; for the articles bound the garrison not to serve against Spain and _her allies_ only, and the United States was not her ally, but only a sympathizer. To say that the “powerful reasons,” to quote from General Washington, were not in Fort George, would be to accuse Galvez of bad faith to his French ally, and untruth, as to the existence of any necessity for his concession to the British.