History of the inductive sciences, from the earliest to the present timeWhewell, William
History
History of the inductive sciences, from the earliest to the present time
Whewell, William
Science -- History
1. _Technical Forms of the Aristotelian Philosophy._--We have
already had occasion to cite some of the distinctions introduced by
Aristotle, which may be considered as technical; for instance, the
classification of Causes as _material_, _formal_, _efficient_, and
_final_; and the opposition of Qualities as _absolute_ and
_relative_. A few more of the most important examples may suffice.
An analysis of objects into _Matter_ and _Form_, when metaphorically
extended from visible objects to things conceived in the most
general manner, became an habitual hypothesis of the Aristotelian
school. Indeed this metaphor is even yet one of the most significant
of those which we can employ, to suggest one of the most comprehensive
and fundamental antitheses with which philosophy has to do;--the
opposition of sense and reason, of {74} impressions and laws. In this
application, the German philosophers have, up to the present time,
rested upon this distinction a great part of the weight of their
systems; as when Kant says, that Space and Time are the _Forms of
Sensation_. Even in our own language, we retain a trace of the
influence of this Aristotelian notion, in the word _Information_, when
used for that knowledge which may be conceived as moulding the mind
into a definite shape, instead of leaving it a mere mass of
unimpressed susceptibility.
Another favorite Aristotelian antithesis is that of _Power_ and
_Act_ (δύναμις, ἐνέργεια). This distinction is made the basis of
most of the physical philosophy of the school; being, however,
generally introduced with a peculiar limitation. Thus, Light is
defined to be "the Act of what is lucid, as being lucid. And if," it
is added, "the lucid be so in power but not in act, we have
darkness." The reason of the limitation, "as being lucid," is, that
a lucid body may act in other ways; thus a torch may move as well as
shine, but its moving is not its act _as being a lucid_ body.
Aristotle appears to be well satisfied with this explanation, for he
goes on to say, "Thus light is not Fire, nor any body whatever, or
the emanation of any body (for that would be a kind of body), but it
is the presence of something like Fire in the body; it is, however,
impossible that two bodies should exist in the same place, so that
it is not a body;" and this reasoning appears to leave him more
satisfied with his doctrine, that Light is an _Energy_ or _Act_.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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