History of the inductive sciences, from the earliest to the present timeWhewell, William
History
History of the inductive sciences, from the earliest to the present time
Whewell, William
Science -- History
"The way[53\1] must be the same," says Aristotle, in speaking of the
rules of reasoning, "with respect to philosophy, as it is with
respect to {84} any art or science whatever; we must collect the
facts, and the things to which the facts happen, in each subject,
and provide as large a supply of these as possible." He then
proceeds to say that "we are not to look at once at all this
collected mass, but to consider small and definite portions" . . .
"And thus it is the office of observation to supply principles in
each subject; for instance, astronomical observation supplies the
principles of astronomical science. For the phenomena being properly
assumed, the astronomical demonstrations were from these discovered.
And the same applies to every art and science. So that if we take
the facts (τὰ ὑπάρχοντα) belonging to each subject, it is _our_ task
to mark out clearly the course of the demonstrations. For if _in our
natural history_ (κατὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν) we have omitted nothing of the
facts and properties which belong to the subject, we shall learn
what we can demonstrate and what we cannot."
[Note 53\1: Anal. Prior. i. 30.]
These facts, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, he, at other times, includes in the term
_sensation_. Thus, he says,[54\1] "It is obvious that if any
sensation is wanting, there must be also some knowledge wanting
which we are thus prevented from having, since we arrive at
knowledge either by induction or by demonstration. Demonstration
proceeds from universal propositions, Induction from particulars.
But we cannot have universal theoretical propositions except from
induction; and we cannot make inductions without having sensation;
for sensation has to do with particulars."
[Note 54\1: Anal. Post. i. 18.]
In another place,[55\1] after stating that principles must be prior
to, and better known than conclusions, he distinguishes such
principles into absolutely prior, and prior relative to us: "The
prior principles, relative to us, are those which are nearer to the
sensation; but the principles absolutely prior are those which are
more remote from the sensation. The most general principles are the
more remote, the more particular are nearer. The general principles
which are necessary to knowledge are _axioms_."
[Note 55\1: Ib. i. 2.]
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