But before this feature of the Constitution had been settled by the committee, they had determined on a mode in which the executive should be appointed. It is singular that the idea of an election of the executive by the people, either mediately or immediately, found so little favor at first, that on its first introduction it received the votes of but two States. Since the executive was to be the agent of the legislative will, it was argued by some members that it ought to be wholly dependent, and ought therefore to be chosen by the legislature. The experience of New York and of Massachusetts, on the other hand,--where the election of the first magistrate by the people had been successfully practised,--and the danger that the legislature and the candidates might play into each other's hands, and thus give rise to constant intrigues for the office, were the arguments employed by others. Upon the introduction of a proposition that the States be divided into districts, for the election by the people of electors of the executive, two States only recorded their votes in its favor, and eight States voted against it.[32] By the vote of eight States it was then determined that the executive should be elected by the national legislature for the term of seven years;[33] and subsequently it was determined that the executive should be ineligible to a second term of office, and should be removable on impeachment and conviction of malpractice or neglect of duty. A single executive was agreed to by a vote of seven States against three.[34] After the mode in which the negative was to be exercised had been settled, an attempt was made to change the appointment, and vest it in the executives of the States. But this proposal was decisively rejected.[35]