History of the Peninsular War, Volume 4 (of 6)Southey, Robert
History
History of the Peninsular War, Volume 4 (of 6)
Southey, Robert
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
This was a specimen of that ill-will towards England which prevailed in
many places among persons of this rank; and Marquis Wellesley perceived
that such persons, if not favoured by the government, were certainly
not discountenanced. The same spirit was manifested but too plainly by
the persons employed about Cuesta’s army. While they were professing
that the English army should be served in preference to their own
people (even to the exclusion of them, if needful), they never offered
to supply a single cart or mule, or any means of transport from their
own abundance. Lord Wellington, for want of such means, was compelled
to leave his ammunition behind him, and then no difficulty was found
in transporting it to the Spanish stores. No difficulty was found
in transporting the bridge of boats from Almaraz to Badajoz; yet
if these means of transport, with which the Spanish army was always
abundantly provided, had been shared with the British army, many of the
difficulties under which it suffered would have been relieved, and its
separation, says Lord Wellington, certainly would not have taken place
when it did. The distress which his men suffered would not have been
felt in an equal degree by the French, or by any people who understood
how to manage their food. Meat they had always in sufficiency, and
their chief want was of bread, ... they were not ingenious enough to
make a comfortable meal without it, though flour or rice was served out
in its stead. But the want of food for the cavalry, and of means of
transport, which actually rendered the British army inefficient, could
not be remedied by any dexterity of the men, or any foresight of the
general, and is wholly imputable to the conduct of the Spanish generals
and the Spanish government. Spain was grievously injured by this
unpardonable misconduct. The English ministry were at this very time
proposing to increase Lord Wellington’s force to 30,000 men, provided
the supreme command were vested in the British general, and effectual
arrangements made for their supply. But in the present state of things,
both the Marquis and his brother perceived that any co-operation
with the Spanish armies would only draw on a repetition of the same
disasters. The intent was therefore abandoned, ♦1809. SEPTEMBER.♦ and
Lord Wellington at the beginning of September, proceeded to Badajoz,
stationing his army, part within the Portugueze frontier, and part on
the Spanish territory, in a position which would menace the flank and
rear of the French if they advanced toward Andalusia.
♦EXPEDITION TO WALCHEREN.♦
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