History of the Peninsular War, Volume 5 (of 6)Southey, Robert
History
History of the Peninsular War, Volume 5 (of 6)
Southey, Robert
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
He forbade any inhabitant of the province to enter Soria
while the enemy kept a garrison there, on pain of being regarded as a
traitor, whatever motive or excuse he might allege. He declared that
every person obeying an order of the intrusive Government should be
put to death, ... every village burnt, ... so that nothing might exist
in Spain which had contributed towards its subjugation. Whenever the
enemy approached a village, the inhabitants were enjoined to leave it,
driving all their cattle into the mountains; and they were commanded
not to leave provision of any kind in their houses, unless it were
poisoned; to the end that either by want or by poison, the enemy, who
were employed in destroying an unoffending people, might be themselves
destroyed. The state of feeling may be understood in which such an
edict could be issued by a provincial Junta who lived in hourly peril,
and whose dearest connexions were the victims of foreign barbarity; but
when the edict itself was sanctioned by the national Government--for
sanctioned it was by being allowed to appear in the Regency’s Gazette
unannulled and uncensured--it became a national disgrace.
When the guerrillas of Asturias, the Biscayan provinces, Soria, or
Rioja, were closely pressed by the enemy, they usually sought refuge
in Navarre, or the higher parts of Aragon: here they had their chief
strength. The French, indeed, complained, in their intercepted
dispatches, that these bands gave the law in Navarre, levied
contributions there, and even collected the duties at the frontier
custom-houses. For this ♦XAVIER MINA.♦ superiority they were beholden
to Xavier Mina. His career was short, but remarkable not less for the
signal successes which he obtained, than for his hair-breadth escapes.
On one occasion he and his little party were driven to seek refuge
on a rock near Estella, where they defended the only accessible side
till night-fall, and escaped during the darkness by letting themselves
down the precipice by a rope. In the course of five months after his
first appearance in the field, his celebrity was such that he might
have raised an army from among the youth of Navarre and Upper Aragon,
if there had been means to arm, and officers to discipline them: owing
to the want of these, and chiefly of officers, he never had more than
1,200 under his command; greater numbers would have embarrassed him,
these he was capable of directing: voluntary rations were provided
for them by the villages, and for ammunition and money he looked to
the enemy, calling the wood of Tafalla his powder-magazine and his
mint. As a farther resource, he levied the duties of which the French
complained, and he collected the rents belonging to the convents and
churches, as having in this extremity reverted to the nation; and
from these funds he was enabled to pay liberally and regularly for
intelligence. The wisdom of his measures, not less than the chivalrous
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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