While one set of unbelievers promoted this act of superstition, and another condescended to it, a decree of more consequence was obtained from the Spanish Government, which had become sensible that the war must now be carried on upon one plan of operations, under the direction of a single mind, and that a mind equal to the ♦LORD WELLINGTON APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE SPANISH ARMIES.♦ emergency had been manifested in Lord Wellington. The Cortes therefore conferred upon him the command in chief of the Spanish armies, during the co-operation of the allied forces in the defence of the peninsula; and the Marquis signified his acceptance of the charge, subject to the Prince Regent’s approbation, “the delay of obtaining which,” he said, “would not impede his operations, because, upon all occasions on which he had communicated with the Generals and Commandants of the Spanish troops, he had received from them the utmost attention, and all the assistance which they could afford him.” The Prince’s consent was not delayed; and in signifying it, his Royal Highness expressed his satisfaction in the measure, as considering it to be a just and signal proof that the Spanish nation rightly appreciated the military talents and reputation of Lord Wellington, and that the Cortes had taken a comprehensive view of the manner in which the war ought to be conducted. ♦HIS SITUATION AT MADRID.♦ Lord Wellington meantime had more reason to be satisfied with the approbation of his own Government, than with the support that it afforded him. Successful as his campaign had thus far been, there had been a loss of time in it, for want of means, and that want had occasioned much to depend upon the chance of circumstances; whereas, had there been an adequate force under his command, the results would have depended as far as possible in war, upon his own sagacity, and the superiority of British troops. An additional force of 15,000 men, with which to have covered the northern frontier during the siege of Badajoz, would have enabled him to fulfil his first intention of marching upon Seville, after the fall of that fortress; the campaign might then have been commenced two months earlier, and time would have remained, after having freed the south of Spain, for operations in the centre and north. Having been compelled to abandon that intention, lest Marmont should recover Ciudad Rodrigo and overrun the north of Portugal, he had succeeded to his utmost hopes in the plan which he had of necessity adopted, not of choice. After that success, the want of adequate means left him as little choice as before. To have marched into Valencia against the collected armies of Soult, Suchet, and the Intruder, would have rendered it impossible to keep up his communications with Portugal; and except on that communication he could have no safe dependence for supplies. There was moreover the weighty consideration that the yellow fever had broken out in Murcia, and had