Although the main Artillery force for this expedition did not embark until the 10th May, 1793, Woolwich was much disquieted after the end of February with incessant demands for battalion guns and the requisite detachments for the regiments under orders for the Low Countries. In no English war was this pernicious system of battalion guns more systematically urged and practised. Occasionally--as will be seen presently--the guns were brigaded; and during the siege operations, as at Valenciennes, the Artillery did duty by companies: but, as a rule, the guns were attached in pairs to the different battalions. Only one waggon accompanied [Sidenote: Ibid.] each pair of guns; and the following was the strength of the Artillery detachment: viz., 1 subaltern, 2 non-commissioned officers, 8 gunners, 3 drivers, and 9 horses. The faults of this system have already been alluded to, but are most [Sidenote: Captain H. W. L. Hime, R.A., on ‘Mobility of Field Artillery.’] clearly shown in the following words:--“To prevent these guns from impeding the movements of the infantry to whom they belonged, their weight was reduced to an extent which made their fire under the most favourable circumstances all but useless. Secondly, as a matter of fact, they did seriously encumber their infantry. For, infantry compelled to drag guns along with them could not be expected to march, even on smooth and level plains, with the same order and rapidity as infantry who marched free from such an encumbrance; and in a cultivated country, intersected with ditches, hedges, and walls, the guns had to be abandoned altogether. In this latter case they not only failed to fulfil the very object of their existence, but left a gap in the line which, as they were generally placed in the centre of the battalion, might produce fatal consequences. Thirdly, as it was necessary for them to take part in all the manœuvres of the battalion, the necessary time was not afforded to the gunners for placing, loading, or laying their guns carefully. No guns could have been effective under this system, which violated _both_ the fundamental principles of Field Artillery tactics, viz., that the movements of a battery in action should be minimum in number, and should be made at a maximum speed. Fourthly, their constant presence with their infantry led the latter to look upon the guns as necessary to the safety of the battalion, and thus diminished that self-confidence which infantry must possess to be successful. Fifthly, as these guns were practically useless, not only was the money spent on their construction wasted, but the regular columns or trains of Artillery were deprived of a corresponding number of guns, which might have been turned to good account by their own officers. In fine, this bad system weakened the Artillery without strengthening the Infantry, and raised a general prejudice against the use in the field of what was regarded as a complicated and useless mechanism.”