“Upon my seeing the President on my return to this place a fortnight ago, he spoke to me with great frankness respecting the state of affairs between this country and Spain; saying that it was possible that the accumulation of the injuries which they had sustained might produce a resolution on the part of the Congress to resent them. With a view to the hostile situation of affairs, he lamented that unfortunately [notwithstanding] the superiority of his Majesty’s naval force and the vigilance of his officers, it had not been possible to prevent the enemy’s fleet from crossing the Atlantic. He said that this experience would render it necessary for the United States to proceed with great caution and to gain time, in order to put their principal seaports in a state of defence, for which he had already given directions. In the event of hostilities he considered that East and West Florida, and successively the Island of Cuba, the possession of which was necessary for the defence of Louisiana and Florida, as being the key to the Gulf of Mexico, would, in the manner in which that island might and would be attacked, be an easy conquest to them. He, however, expressed that his individual voice would constantly be for the preservation of peace with every Power, till it could no longer be kept without absolute dishonor.” Such speculations were not so practical as to affect Merry’s antipathy to the American government, but he reported them to Lord Mulgrave without comment, as intended to express the President’s plan in case of a Spanish war. Meanwhile the Secretary of State was engaged in composing a pamphlet, or book, to prove that the new rule adopted by Great Britain was an act of bad faith, in violation of international law. The task was not difficult. Such was the diplomatic situation at Washington, Nov. 12, 1805, when the Cabinet adopted Jefferson’s plan of reopening negotiations for the purchase of Florida on the line so persistently recommended by the irresponsible creatures of Talleyrand, and so steadily rejected to that moment by Madison and Monroe. Congress was to meet in three weeks, and within that time the diplomatic chaos must be reduced to order. CHAPTER V. AUGUST 27, 1805, President Jefferson, writing to Madison from Monticello, said:[89] “Considering the character of Bonaparte, I think it material at once to let him see that we are not of the Powers who will receive his orders.” In Europe, on the same day, the Emperor broke up the camp at Boulogne and set his army in motion toward Ulm and Austerlitz. September 4 he was at Paris, busy with the thousand details of imminent war: his armies were in motion, his vast diplomatic and military plans were taking shape.