History of the United States of America, Volume 6 (of 9) : $b During the first administration of James MadisonAdams, Henry
History
History of the United States of America, Volume 6 (of 9) : $b During the first administration of James Madison
Adams, Henry
United States -- History -- 1801-1809; United States -- History -- 1809-1817
Yet the true intentions of the President and his Cabinet were as
uncertain as those of the Twelfth Congress, which had not yet met. A
very large part of the public could not believe war to be possible,
and the Government itself shared so far in the doubt as to wait for
Congress to give the impulse so often refused. When the President and
his Cabinet met in Washington to prepare for the session of Congress
called for November 4, a month earlier than usual, neither the Cabinet
nor the congressmen felt a certainty of the future; and so little did
the outside world believe in war, that Madison, Monroe, and Gallatin
were supposed to be aiming at a diplomatic rather than at a military
victory. In truth they had no well-defined plan. The process by which
a scattered democracy decided its own will, in a matter so serious as
a great and perhaps fatal war, was new to the world; bystanders were
surprised and amused at the simplicity with which the people disputed
plans of war and peace, giving many months of warning and exact
information to the enemy, while they showed no sign of leadership,
discipline, or union, or even a consciousness that such qualities were
needed. Men like Josiah Quincy, Rufus King, John Randolph, and even
Madison and Gallatin, seeing that the people themselves, like the
machine of government they had invented, were incompetent to the work
of war, waited with varied emotions, but equally believing or fearing
that at last a fatal crisis was at hand.
Monroe was far from easy; but he had accepted, as was his wont, the
nearest dominating will, and he drifted without an effort, although
his old friends had already parted company with him. Though obliged to
support the President in holding that Napoleon’s decrees were withdrawn
so that they had ceased to violate the neutral commerce of the United
States, he showed that he did so, not so much because he thought it the
truth, as because England gave him no choice. To Serurier, the French
minister, Monroe made little concealment of his real wishes; and when
Serurier first called at the Department after Monroe’s return from
Virginia, he heard nothing that greatly pleased him.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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