Drummond’s situation was told in his reports to Sir George Prevost. September 8 be wrote[126] that he should not fail to seize any favorable opportunity to attack; “but should no such opportunity present itself, I feel it incumbent on me to prepare your Excellency for the possibility of my being compelled by sickness or suffering of the troops, exposed as they will be to the effects of the wet and unhealthy season which is fast approaching, to withdraw them from their present position to one which may afford them the means of cover. Sickness has, I am sorry to say, already made its appearance in several of the corps.” Three days afterward, September 11,[127] Drummond was warned by several signs that his lines were to be attacked by Brown, although “whether the account which is _invariably_ given by deserters of his intention to act offensively ... be correct, I have not yet been able accurately to ascertain.” Drummond’s batteries had been almost silent for several days for want of ammunition, and he could do nothing till the arrival of reinforcements,--the Ninety-seventh regiment,--unaccountably delayed. Rain had begun, and he dreaded its effect on the troops. In his next despatch, dated September 14,[128] he said that the rain had been incessant, and “as the whole of the troops are without tents, and the huts in which they are placed are wholly incapable of affording shelter against such severe weather, their situation is most distressing.” The roads were impassable; the nearest depot of supplies was Fort George, and Drummond had not cattle enough to move a third of his heavy ordnance if a sudden movement should be necessary. The enemy seemed about to cross the river in his rear, and the Ninety-seventh regiment had not yet arrived:-- “In the mean time I have strong grounds for thinking that the enemy will risk an attack,--an event which though from the necessity of defending my batteries in the first instance with the pickets alone I shall have to meet under every possible disadvantage, yet I am very much disposed to hope may be the most fortunate circumstance which can happen, as it will bring us in contact with the enemy at a far cheaper rate than if we were to be the assailants.” While Drummond struggled between the necessity of retreat and the difficulty of retreating, Brown was bent on attacking his lines. The plan was open to grave objections, and a council of war, September 9, discouraged the idea. Brown was much disappointed and irritated at the result of the council, especially with Ripley; but while giving the impression that he acquiesced, he brought over all the volunteers he could obtain.[129] The number was never precisely given, but according to the official reports of General Peter B. Porter who commanded them, and of General Brown himself, they did not exceed one thousand.[130] With these, and an equal number of regular troops, Brown undertook to assault Drummond’s entrenchments.