History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 1Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 1
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
In Estremadura the activity and means of the junta were not at
first sufficient to excite much attention; but in Leon, Old
Castile, and Gallicia, a cloud was gathering that threatened a
perilous storm. Don Gregorio Cuesta was captain-general of the two
former kingdoms: inimical to popular movements, and of a haughty
resolute disposition, he at first checked the insurrection with a
rough hand; by this conduct he laid the foundation for quarrels
and intrigues, which afterwards impeded the military operations,
and split the northern provinces into factions; finally, however,
he joined the side of the patriots. Behind him the kingdom of
Gallicia, under the direction of Filanghieri, had prepared a
large and efficient force. It was composed of the strong and
disciplined body of troops which, under the command of Tarranco,
had taken possession of Oporto, and after that general’s death
had returned with general Belesta to Gallicia. The garrisons
of Ferrol and Coruña and a number of soldiers, flying from the
countries occupied by the French, swelled the regular army, the
agents of Great Britain were actively employed in blowing the flame
of insurrection; money, arms, and clothing, were poured into the
province through their hands; Coruña afforded an easy and direct
intercourse with England, and a strict connexion was maintained
between the Gallician and Portuguese patriots.
The facility of establishing the base of a regular systematic war
in Gallicia was therefore as great as in Andalusia, the resources
perhaps greater on account of the proximity of Great Britain, and
the advantage of position at this time was essentially in favour
of Gallicia, because the sources of her strength were equally
well covered from the direct line of the French operations, and
the slightest offensive movement upon her part threatened the
communications of the French army in Madrid, and endangered
the safety of any corps marching from the capital against the
southern provinces. To be prepared against the Gallician forces
was, therefore, a matter of pressing importance; a defeat from
that quarter would have been felt in all parts of the army; and
no considerable or sustained operation could have been undertaken
against the other insurgent forces until the strength of Gallicia
had been first broken.
In Biscay and the Asturias the want of regular troops and fortified
towns, and the contracted shape of those provinces, placed them
completely within the power of the French, who had nothing to fear
as long as they could maintain possession of the sea-ports.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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