History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
“In Catalonia, every thing seems to have gone wrong since the
fall of Rosas. The Spaniards are in considerable force, yet are
dispersed and panic-struck whenever the enemy appears.”--“The
applications for supplies are unlimited; they want money, arms,
and ammunition, of which no use appears to be made when they get
them.”--“In the English papers, I see accounts of successes, and
convoys cut off, and waggons destroyed, which are not true. What
has been done in that way has been by the boats of our frigates,
which have, in two or three instances, landed men and attacked
the enemy with great gallantry. The Somatenes range the hills in
a disorderly way, and fire at a distance, but retire on being
approached.”--“The multitudes of men do not make a force.”
Add to this the Spanish historian Cabane’s statements that the
Migueletes were always insubordinate, detested the service of the
line, and were many of them armed only with staves, and we have the
full measure of the Catalans’ resistance.
11º.--It was not the vigour of the Catalans, but of the English,
that in this province, as in every part of the Peninsula, retarded
the progress of the French. Would St. Cyr have wasted a month
before Rosas? Would he have been hampered in his movements by his
fears for the safety of Barcelona? Would he have failed to besiege
and take Tarragona and Tortosa, if a French fleet had attended his
progress by the coast, or if it could even have made two runs in
safety? To lord Collingwood, who, like the Roman Bibulus, perished
of sickness on his decks rather than relax in his watching,--to his
keen judgement, his unceasing vigilance, the resistance made by the
Catalans was due. His fleet it was that interdicted the coast-line
to the French, protected the transport of the Spanish supplies from
Valencia, assisted in the defence of the towns, aided the retreat
of the beaten armies; in short, did that which the Spanish fleets
in Cadiz and Carthagena should have done. But the supreme junta,
equally disregarding the remonstrances of lord Collingwood, the
good of their own country, and the treaty with England, by which
they were bound to prevent their ships from falling into the hands
of the enemy, left their fleets to rot in harbour, although money
was advanced, and the assistance of the British seamen offered, to
fit them out for sea.
Having now related the principal operations that took place in the
eastern and central provinces of Spain, which were so suddenly
overrun by the French emperor; having shown that, however restless
the Spaniards were under the yoke imposed upon them, they were
unable to throw it off; I shall turn to Portugal, where the tide of
invasion still flowing onward, although with diminished volume, was
first stayed, and finally overpowered and forced back, by a counter
flood of mightier strength.
BOOK VI.
CHAPTER I.
TRANSACTIONS IN PORTUGAL.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 1.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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