To effect the isolating of Marmont’s army, the first condition was to be as early in the field as the rainy season would permit, and before the coming harvest enabled the other French armies to move in large bodies. But Marmont could avail himself, successively, of the lines of the Tormes and the Douro to protract the campaign until the ripening of the harvest enabled reinforcements to join him, and hence the security of the allies’ flanks and rear during the operations, and of their retreat, if overpowered, was to be previously looked to. Soult, burning to revenge the loss of Badajos, might attack Hill with superior numbers, or detach a force across the Tagus, which, in conjunction with the army of the centre, now directed by Jourdan, could advance upon Portugal by the valley of the Tagus, and so turn the right flank of the allied army in Castile. Boats and magazines supplied from Toledo and Madrid, were already being collected at the fort of Lugar Nueva, near Almaraz, and from hence, as from a place of arms, the French could move upon Coria, Placencia, and Castelo Branco, menacing Abrantes, Celorico, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Almeida, while detachments from the army of the north reinforced the army of Portugal. But to obviate this last danger Wellington had planned one of those enterprizes, which as they are successful, principally because of their exceeding boldness, are beheld with astonishment when achieved, and are attributed to madness when they fail. SURPRISE OF ALMARAZ. For a clear understanding of this event, the reader must call to mind, 1º. that the left bank of the Tagus, from Toledo to Almaraz, is lined with rugged mountains, the ways through which, impracticable for an army, are difficult even for small divisions; 2º. that from Almaraz to the frontier of Portugal, the banks, although more open, were still difficult, and the Tagus was only to be crossed at certain points, to which bad roads leading through the mountains descended. But from Almaraz to Alcantara, all the bridges had been long ruined, and those of Arzobispo and Talavera, situated between Almaraz and Toledo, were of little value, because of the ruggedness of the mountains above spoken of. Soult’s pontoon equipage had been captured in Badajos, and the only means of crossing the Tagus, possessed by the French, from Toledo to the frontier of Portugal, was a boat-bridge laid down at Almaraz by Marmont, and to secure which he had constructed three strong forts and a bridge-head. The first of these forts, called Ragusa, was a magazine, containing many stores and provisions, and it was, although not finished, exceedingly strong, having a loopholed stone tower, twenty-five feet high within, and being flanked without by a field-work near the bridge. [Sidenote: Jones’s Sieges.]