If the Secretary of State’s withdrawal from the market and the consequent scarcity of bills on India is insufficient to support exchange at 1s. 3–29/32d., more drastic measures are necessary. The method adopted on the last occasion of this kind was the offer by the Government of India in Calcutta of _sterling bills on London_ at the rate of 1s. 3–29/32d., these bills being cashed in London out of the Gold Standard Reserve. These measures were sufficient during the severe crisis of 1908. Their sufficiency for the future will be discussed in Chapter VI. in dealing with the Secretary of State’s Reserves. 13. If we turn from the mechanism of remittance to the question of Government remittance as a whole, this can be explained most clearly by reference to a hypothetical India Office balance–sheet. The whole account for the year balances out in some such manner as this:— PAYMENTS Home Charges _x_ Gold “earmarked,” or securities bought for Currency Reserve in London _y_ Cost of silver + profit on coinage credited to Gold Standard Reserve in London _z_ Expenditure on stores in London for capital purposes in India _v_ Transfer of cash balances from India to London ± _w_ —————————————– _x_ + _y_ + _z_ + _v_ ± _w_ =========================== RECEIPTS Council Bills cashed from balances in India _x_ – _u_ + _v_ ± _w_ Council Bills cashed from rupees in Currency Reserve in India _y_ Council Bills cashed from new coinage _z_ ————————————————– Total Council Bills drawn _x_ + _y_ + _z_ – _u_ + _v_ ± _w_ Net capital borrowings in London _u_ ————————————————– Total receipts in London _x_ + _y_ + _z_ + _v_ ± _w_ ================================= 14. I will conclude this chapter with some statistics.