Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis : $b a course of twenty-eight lectures delivered at the University of ViennaFreud, Sigmund
Science
Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis : $b a course of twenty-eight lectures delivered at the University of Vienna
Freud, Sigmund
Psychoanalysis
The forgetting of impressions and experiences shows the working of the
tendency to ward off from memory that which is unpleasant much more
clearly and invariably than the forgetting of names. It does not of
course belong in its entirety to the category of errors, but only in so
far as it appears to us remarkable and unjustified, judged by the
standard of general experience; as, for instance, where recent or
important impressions are forgotten, or where one memory is forgotten
out of an otherwise well-remembered sequence. How and why we have the
capacity of forgetting in general, particularly how we are able to
forget experiences which have certainly left the deepest impression on
us, such as the events of our childhood, is quite a different problem,
in which the defence against painful associations plays a certain part
but is far from explaining everything. That unwelcome impressions are
easily forgotten is an indubitable fact. Various psychologists have
remarked it; and the great Darwin was so well aware of it that he made a
golden rule for himself of writing down with particular care
observations which seemed unfavourable to his theory, having become
convinced that just these would be inclined to slip out of recollection.
Those who bear for the first time of this principle of defence against
unpleasant memory by forgetfulness seldom fail to raise the objection
that, on the contrary, in their experience it is just that which is
painful which it is hard to forget, since it always comes back to mind
to torture the person against his will—as, for example, the recollection
of grievances or humiliations. This fact is quite correct, but the
objection is not sound. It is important to begin early to reckon with
the fact that the mind is an arena, a sort of tumbling-ground, for the
struggles of antagonistic impulses; or, to express it in non-dynamic
terms, that the mind is made up of contradictions and pairs of
opposites. Evidence of one particular tendency does not in the least
preclude its opposite; there is room for both of them. The material
questions are: How do these opposites stand to one another and what
effects proceed from one of them and what from the other?
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