None of these logics, Dewey finds, is capable of dealing with the actual procedure of science, because none of them treats thought as a doubt-inquiry process, but rather as something fixed and limited by conditions which determine its operations in advance. Dewey asks: "Does not an account or theory of thinking, basing itself on modern scientific procedure, demand a statement in which all the distinctions and terms of thought--judgment, concept, inference, subject, predicate and copula of judgment, etc. _ad indefinitum_--shall be interpreted simply and entirely as distinctive functions or divisions of labor within the doubt-inquiry process?"[172] Seven years before, Dewey had been an ardent champion of the transcendental logic, on the ground that it was progressive, and he contrasted it most favorably with the formal logics which treat thought as a self-contained process. Now, however, he has a new insight. Logic must be reinterpreted in the light of the evolutionary or biological method. We shall see how this is accomplished in the next chapter. To the student of the history of philosophy, Dewey's treatment of the genetic and historical methods must seem seriously inadequate. The idealist, moreover, will feel that Dewey should have taken note, in his criticism of the idealistic standpoint, of the fact that Hegelianism was from first to last a historical method; that the German idealists gave the impulse to modern historical research, and provoked a study of the historical method whose results are still felt. But in turning away from idealism, Dewey has no word of appreciation for this aspect of the Hegelian philosophy. When the truth is boiled down, it appears that Dewey's historical method, in so far as he had one, was based on biological evolutionism. He had no interest in any other form of historical interpretation. FOOTNOTES: [138] Vol. VIII, pp. 321-341. The article is a criticism of Huxley's essay with the same title. [139] _Ibid._, p. 337. Italics mine. [140] _Op. cit._, p. 338. [141] _Ibid._, p. 340. [142] _Ibid._ [143] _Ibid._ It should be observed that this conclusion is reached on a purely theoretical basis. [144] Printed in the _Psychological Review_, Vol. VII, 1900, pp. 105-124. [145] _Ibid._, p. 123. [146] _Ibid._, p. 124. [147] Vol. XI, pp. 107-124; 353-371. [148] _Ibid._, p. 108. [149] _Ibid._, p. 109. [150] _Ibid._ [151] _Op. cit._, p. 110. [152] _Ibid._, p. 111. [153] _Op. cit._, p. 112. [154] _Ibid._, p. 113. [155] _Op. cit._, p. 114. [156] _Ibid._, p. 116. [157] _Ibid._, p. 118. [158] _Op. cit._, p. 355. [159] _Ibid._, p. 356. [160] See Bosanquet's _Logic_, second edition, Chapter VII, and especially page 240. [161] _Philosophical Review_, Vol. XI, p. 357. [162] _Ibid._, p. 360. [163] _Ibid._, p. 358. [164] _Op. cit._, p. 364 f. [165] _Op. cit._, p. 370. [166] Vol. IX, pp. 465-489. [167] _Op. cit._, p. 465. [168] _Ibid._, p. 486 f. [169] _Ibid._, p. 487. [170] _Ibid._ [171] _Ibid._