It will be for the military reader to form his own judgment, as my experience does not warrant me in giving an opinion of the motives and actions of my superiors. I have trusted a great deal throughout my accounts, to officers who were actually present in this remarkable campaign. It is curious to note the opinions of others. One thing however seems tolerably clear, that the only mode by which a really true account of any battle can be given, is to obtain a statement from some competent officer of each corps, troop, or company of artillery, etc., actually present in the field. The practice, in this respect in the Indian army is this: each brigadier reports to the major-general commanding his division, upon the efficiency and prominent services of each regiment in his brigade, noting also the disposition of each corps; the major-general in a similar manner makes a report to the Adjutant-General for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, of the state of each of his brigades, and the particular services rendered. It is from these divisional reports that the Commander-in-Chief draws up his despatches. It is obvious, that after a great battle, particularly if there be a pursuit of the enemy, no correct return of the killed and wounded can be given for two, three, or four days; for those who are killed lie on the field, and those who are wounded will get into a village, if near, and remain concealed there. The Sikhs having thus, as we have stated, drawn their various forces from Moodkee, Ferozepore, and Nuggur Ghât, concentrated them at Ferozeshah, and formed their entrenchments, which in several places they threw up breast high. Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Hardinge, the Governor-General, who was second in command, shared all the fatigues and dangers of the army with the Commander-in-Chief. Orders had been despatched to Sir John Littler to join head-quarters immediately. He accordingly left only a small garrison at Ferozepore, and, with a body of about 5,000 men and twenty-one guns, effected the junction, about noon on the 21st of December. Measures for a general attack were at once planned; but a considerable delay occurred, and much time was lost, as we have stated, in consequence of the conflicting views of competent officers, as to whether it was desirable to make an immediate attack, or to defer it till the following morning. The former was ultimately resolved upon.