In the course of the day, soon after we had finished our long and fatiguing march, we were surprised to find that we were to return in the direction of Ferozepore, in company with Major General Sir John Grey's detachment, which, at this time, was a march or two in our rear. This detachment consisted of three troops of horse artillery, H.M. 16th Lancers, 3rd Light Cavalry, H.M. 10th Foot, three regiments of Native Infantry, a company of Sappers and Miners, and the 4th Irregular Horse. This formed a force of about 7,500 men. There were besides, twelve twelve-pounders and eighteen horse artillery guns; in all thirty guns, or four to every thousand men, a force as large as that with which the Duke of Wellington fought the battle of Assaye, on the 23rd of September, 1803; for, excluding the 3,000 Mysore, etc., cavalry, he had only 4,500 men. The enemy was defeated with the loss of 120 guns taken, destroyed, or lost; the captured guns amounted to above 100. It may be asked, why, when the Duke of Wellington, with a mere handful of soldiers, attacked some 35,000 men and gained such an action, we could not utterly eradicate even the very name of Sikh? The reasons are threefold. The battles of Moodkee and Aliwal were field actions; those of Ferozeshah and Sobraon were storming entrenchments. The strength of the entrenchments at Ferozeshah was not equal to those at Sobraon. The number of killed and wounded at Ferozeshah amounted to 2,419, and at Sobraon 2,383. At the former battle, the enemy had more than one hundred, at the latter sixty-seven guns, and two hundred camel-swivels; besides, at Sobraon, the Sikhs had two strong batteries in the rear of the right and left flanks of the entrenchment; for there were entrenchments and works within one another. We made three good attacks. The attack in front by Major-General Gilbert's division was not originally designed. There was a bank or mound of earth between this division and the entrenchment. The brigade, of which the 29th Foot composed a part, got jammed up, and formed into a wedge, something like the Roman form. It was at first intended that this division should wait as a reserve, and act if required, There was a failure in the right attack on the enemy's left.