Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future MetaphysicsKant, Immanuel
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
Kant, Immanuel
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800; Metaphysics -- Early works to 1800
Such an insight into the nature of the categories, which limits them
at the same time to the mere use of experience, never occurred either
to their first author, or to any of his successors; but without this
insight (which immediately depends upon their derivation or
deduction), they are quite useless and only a miserable list of names,
without explanation or rule for their use. Had the ancients ever
conceived such a notion, doubtless the whole study of the pure
rational knowledge, which under the name of metaphysics has for
centuries spoiled many a sound mind, would have reached us in quite
another shape, and would have enlightened the human understanding,
instead of actually exhausting it in obscure and vain speculations,
thereby rendering it unfit for true science.
This system of categories makes all treatment of every object of pure
reason itself systematic, and affords a direction or clue how and
through what points of inquiry every metaphysical consideration must
proceed, in order to be complete; for it exhausts all the possible
movements (momenta) of the understanding, among which every concept
must be classed. In like manner the table of Principles has been
formulated, the completeness of which we can only vouch for by the
system of the categories. Even in the division of the concepts,{25}
which must go beyond the physical application of the understanding, it
is always the very same clue, which, as it must always be determined a
priori by the same fixed points of the human understanding, always
forms a closed circle. There is no doubt that the object of a pure
conception either of the understanding or of reason, so far as it is
to be estimated philosophically and on a priori principles, can in
this way be completely cognised. I could not therefore omit to make
use of this clue with regard to one of the most abstract ontological
divisions, viz., the various distinctions of "the notions of something
and of nothing," and to construct accordingly (Critique, p. 207) a
regular and necessary table of their divisions.{26}
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{25} See the two tables in the chapters Von den Paralogismen der reinen
Vernuuft and the first division of the Antinomy of Pure Reason, System
der kosmologischen Ideen.
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