Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future MetaphysicsKant, Immanuel
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
Kant, Immanuel
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800; Metaphysics -- Early works to 1800
HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE?
§ 40.
Pure mathematics and pure science of nature had no occasion for such a
deduction, as we have made of both, for their own safety and
certainty. For the former rests upon its own evidence; and the latter
(though sprung from pure sources of the understanding) upon experience
and its thorough confirmation. Physics cannot altogether refuse and
dispense with the testimony of the latter; because with all its
certainty, it can never, as philosophy, rival mathematics. Both
sciences therefore stood in need of this inquiry, not for themselves,
but for the sake of another science, metaphysics.
Metaphysics has to do not only with concepts of nature, which always
find their application in experience, but also with pure rational
concepts, which never can be given in any possible experience.
Consequently the objective reality of these concepts (viz., that they
are not mere chimeras), and the truth or falsity of metaphysical
assertions, cannot be discovered or confirmed by any experience. This
part of metaphysics however is precisely what constitutes its
essential end, to which the rest is only a means, and thus this
science is in need of such a deduction for its own sake. The third
question now proposed relates therefore as it were to the root and
essential difference of metaphysics, i.e., the occupation of Reason
with itself, and the supposed knowledge of objects arising immediately
from this incubation of its own concepts, without requiring, or indeed
being able to reach that knowledge through, experience.{28}
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{28} If we can say, that a science is actual at least in the ideas of
all men, as soon as it appears that the problems which lead to it are
proposed to everybody by the nature of human reason, and that
therefore many (though faulty) endeavors are unavoidably made in its
behalf, then we are bound to say that metaphysics is subjectively (and
indeed necessarily) actual, and therefore we justly ask, how is it
(objectively) possible.
===================================
Without solving this problem reason never is justified. The empirical
use to which reason limits the pure understanding, does not fully
satisfy the proper destination of the latter. Every single experience
is only a part of the whole sphere of its domain, but the absolute
totality of all possible experience is itself not experience. Yet it
is a necessary [concrete] problem for reason, the mere representation
of which requires concepts quite different from the categories, whose
use is only immanent, or refers to experience, so far as it can be
given. Whereas the concepts of reason aim at the completeness, i.e.,
the collective unity of all possible experience, and thereby transcend
every given experience. Thus they become transcendent.
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