THE DEFENSIVE BATTLE has seldom effected positive results, except, perhaps, at _Gettysburg_ (July 1-3, 1863), where Meade permitted Lee to break his forces against a strong position, with the result that the Army of Northern Virginia had to withdraw, and the invasion of the North came to an end. It must, however, be borne in mind that General Lee was badly served by his subordinate, and General Meade's success was largely due to this factor. On the second day of Gettysburg (July 2, 1863), General J. B. Hood's 1st Division of General J. Longstreet's I. Army Corps was deploying round the left of the Federal Army south of the Round Tops. He saw a chance to strike and requested permission from Longstreet. Hood's plan was the only one which gave a reasonable chance of decisive victory with the troops available. Longstreet, in obedience to the letter of his orders, but contrary to their spirit, refused to sanction Hood's advance. Longstreet's failure to seize a fleeting opportunity sounded the death-knell of the Confederate cause. {46} Burnside was defeated at _Fredericksburg_ (December 10-16, 1862) by purely defensive tactics, but Lee had intended to follow up his victory by a decisive counter-blow, which Burnside escaped by extricating the Army of the Potomac before the blow fell. Success, even to the limited degree achieved by Meade or Lee, seldom follows the adoption of purely defensive tactics. "There is no such thing as an 'impregnable position,' for any position the defence of which is merely passive is bound to be carried at last by a manoeuvring enemy" (Marshal Foch). THE OFFENSIVE BATTLE.--The Entirely Offensive system has been employed by many of the greatest commanders, including Marlborough at _Blenheim_ (August 2, 1704), _Ramillies_ (May 23, 1706), and _Malplaquet_ (September 11, 1709); Frederick the Great, notably at _Leuthen_ (December 5, 1757); Napoleon, Wellington, and Grant, as also by the Prussian generals at almost every engagement in the campaigns of 1866 and 1870-71. The disadvantage of the system is that lack of success may entail not only a local disaster but the wreck and annihilation of the whole army.