Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
The first great division of our course of inquiry is purely
physiological. It has for its object the mind, considered as
susceptible of various states or affections, and constituting, as
it is thus variously affected, the whole phenomena of thought and
feeling, which, though expressed by a variety of terms, of functions,
or faculties, are still but the _one_ mind itself existing in different
states. On retracing these states, which form the whole progress of
our sentient, intellectual, and moral life, we have to inquire into
the properties of the substance, mind, according to the same laws of
investigation, by which we inquire into the properties of external
substances,--not by assuming principles, from which the phenomena may
be supposed to flow, but by observing and generalizing, till we arrive
at those few simple principles or laws, which, however pompous the
term _laws_ may seem, as if it denoted something different from the
phenomena themselves, and paramount to them, are in truth, nothing
more than the expression of the most general circumstances, in which
the phenomena themselves have been felt by us to agree. As we say of
gold, that it is that which is of a certain specific weight, yellow,
ductile, fusible at a certain temperature, and capable of certain
combinations,--because all these properties have been observed by
ourselves or others,--so we say of the _mind_, that it is that which
perceives, remembers, compares, and is susceptible of various emotions
or other feelings; because of all these we have been conscious, or have
observed them indirectly in others. We are not entitled to state with
confidence any quality, as a property of gold, which we do not remember
to have observed ourselves, or to have received on the faith of the
observation of others, whose authority we have reason to consider as
indubitable; and as little are we entitled to assert any quality, or
general susceptibility, as belonging to the human _mind_, of which we
have not been conscious ourselves in the feelings resulting from it, or
for which we have not the authority of the indubitable consciousness of
others. The exact coincidence, in this respect, of the physics of mind
and of matter, it is important that you should have constantly before
you, that you may not be led to regard the comparative indistinctness
and vagueness of the mental phenomena as a warrant for greater
boldness of assertion, and looseness of reasoning with respect to
them. There is, on the contrary, in such a case, still greater reason
to adhere rigidly to the strict rules of philosophizing; because the
less definite the phenomena are, the greater danger is there of being
misled in discriminating and classing them. The laws of inquiry,
those general principles of the logic of physics, which regulate our
search of truth in all things, external and internal, do not vary with
the name of a science, or its objects or instruments. They are not
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