Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding: A Critical ExpositionDewey, John
Philosophy
Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding: A Critical Exposition
Dewey, John
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646-1716
Certain monads reach a state of development, or manifestation of
activity, which is characterized by the possession of distinct
organs. Such monads may be called, in a pre-eminent sense, "souls,"
and include all the higher animals as well as man. This possession of
differentiated organs finds its analogue in the internal condition of
the monad. What appears externally as an organ of sense appears ideally
as a conscious representative state which we call "sensation." "When,"
Leibniz says, "the monad has its organs so developed that there
is relief and differentiation in the impressions received, and
consequently in the perceptions which represent them, we have feeling
or sensation; that is, a perception accompanied by memory," to which
at other times he adds "attention." Life, he says, "is a perceptive
principle; the soul is sensitive life; mind is rational soul." And
again he says in substance that when the soul begins to have interests,
and to regard one representation as of more value than others, it
introduces relief into its perceptions, and those which stand out are
called "sensations."
This origin of sensations as higher developments of the representative
activities of a monad conditions their relation to further processes
of knowledge. The sensations are confused knowledge; they are ideas
in their primitive and most undifferentiated form. They constitute,
as Leibniz somewhere says, the vertigo of the conscious life. In every
sentient organism multitudes of sensations are constantly thronging in
and overpowering its distinct consciousness. The soul is so flooded
with ideas of everything in the world which has any relation to
its body that it has distinct ideas of nothing. Higher knowledge,
then, does not consist in compounding these sensations; that would
literally make confusion worse confounded. It consists in introducing
distinctness into the previously confused sensations,--in finding out
what they mean; that is, in finding out their bearings, what they point
to, and how they are related. Knowledge is not an external process
performed upon the sensations, it is the development of their internal
content.
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